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Abstract 
Can stimulative monetary policy be effective when there is a “liquidity trap”?  This 
question surfaced during the Great Depression and is raising its head again today due to the 
current financial crisis.  A definitive answer never materialized for the 1930’s, as differences of 
opinion between non-monetarist and monetarist economists arose about this issue.  This need not 
be the case today.  In this thesis I will first enumerate several different meanings of the term 
“liquidity trap” and their implications for monetary policy. Then, with data from the Federal 
Reserve, I will attempt to validate the likelihood of a liquidity trap.  I do this for the demand for 
money and bank liquidity traps. I use regression analysis over a fifteen year period with varying 
interest rates to determine if the elasticities of demand increase as interest rates fall, indicating  a 
liquidity trap.  My use of log linear regressions for both demand for money  and bank liquidity 
traps, using data from the present financial crisis, adds to the evidence supporting the liquidity 
hypothesis, but does not empirically establish the existence of a liquidity trap. 
 Following my findings, I detail actions taken by the Federal Reserve and show the 
subsequent results through the summer and into the fall of 2009.  From this, I make a conclusion 
that the United States is most likely in a liquidity trap and it does matter. 
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CHAPTER 1 - “Liquidity Trap” 
Is monetary policy effective when there is a “liquidity trap”?  This question surfaced 
during the Great Depression and is raising its head again today due to the current financial crisis.  
A definitive answer never materialized for the 1930’s as differences of opinion regarding the 
cause of the Great Depression between non-monetarist and monetarist economist arose.  This 
need not be the case today.  In this thesis I will first enumerate several different meanings of the 
term “liquidity trap” and their implications for monetary policy. Then, with data from the Federal 
Reserve, I will attempt to validate the likelihood of a liquidity trap.  I will detail actions taken by 
the Federal Reserve and the subsequent results on the economy.  From this, a conclusion can be 
made on whether the existence of a liquidity trap matters. 
Liquidity 
Before discussing a “liquidity trap”, the term “liquidity” needs to be understood.  It is 
important to understand the word “liquidity”, because a financial crisis can occur when liquidity 
disappears.  Liquidity has several different meanings.  The most common and generalized 
meaning refers to the “relative ease with which an asset can be converted to money without 
significant commissions or other charges, inconvenience, and risk of loss of principal.”1
Funding liquidity is similar to asset liquidity and is generally used in the world of 
financiers.  “Funding liquidity describes the ease with which expert investors and arbitrageurs 
can obtain funding from (possibly less informed) financiers.”
  Cash is 
one hundred percent liquid, while other assets have varying degrees of liquidity.  This type of 
liquidity is referred to as asset liquidity.  There is however, liquidity known as funding liquidity 
and market liquidity. 
2
                                                 
1 Lloyd B. Thomas, Money, Banking and Financial Markets (Thomson, South-Western, 2006), p.26. 
  When it is easy to raise money, it 
is said that markets are “awash in liquidity” and therefore funding liquidity is high.  The term 
“funding liquidity” is important to understand because some financial institutions rely largely on 
2 Markus K. Brunnermeier, “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 23, No. 1 (Winter 2009) 91. 
 2 
short term debt, such as commercial paper and repurchase agreements (known as “repos”) that 
need to be rolled over nearly continuously.  When financial institutions are unable to roll over 
this debt, it puts the institution in a precarious situation because it is in effect analogous to a run 
on the bank.3
“The word “liquidity” is sometimes used in the context to describe the availability of 
credit in the financial market.”
 For those that invest in stocks it would be similar to a 100 percent margin call. 
4
Researchers Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin have come up with a new definition for 
liquidity in their article, “Liquidity, Monetary Policy, and Financial Cycles”, published by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its periodical Current Issues in January/February 2008.  
In this article, they define liquidity as the “rate of growth of aggregate balance sheets” or, as 
they go on to say, “in more concrete terms, we can define liquidity as the rate of growth of repos, 
since repos and other forms of collateralized borrowing are the tools that financial institutions 
use to adjust their balance sheets.”  They feel that their definition of liquidity is better for a 
modern, market based financial system. 
  For example, individuals might say there is a lack of liquidity in 
the market.  This means that it is difficult to borrow money (i.e., get credit).  This is known as 
market liquidity.  Like liquidity of an asset, the concept of market liquidity is relative.  Some 
individuals or companies may not be able to obtain loans in a very liquid market, or will have to 
pay a relatively high interest rate.  Other individuals or companies can obtain loans even in 
markets considered illiquid.  Market liquidity is considered low, when selling the asset 
significantly depresses the sale price.  With respect to financial institutions, it then becomes 
costly to shrink the balance sheet. 
Market liquidity and monetary policy are closely associated, as related by Ben Bernanke, 
chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system in a speech at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial Conference, in May of 2008.  He states that “well-functioning 
financial markets are an essential link in the transmission of monetary policy to the economy and 
a critical foundation for economic growth and stability.”  It was for this reason that the Federal 
                                                 
3 Ibid. p.96. 
4 Daniel L. Thorton, “The Fed, Liquidity, and Credit Allocation” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Review, January/February 2009, 91(1), pp. 13-21. 
 3 
Reserve recently implemented liquidity measures, as a sharp housing contraction resulted in a 
tightening of credit by the financial markets in the current financial crisis.5
Liquidity Trap 
 
Now that the meaning of the word “liquidity” and its importance to monetary policy has 
been defined, I will proceed with defining what is meant by a “liquidity trap”.  Just like the word 
“liquidity” the term “liquidity trap” has different meanings.  A trap can occur in the demand for 
money or a trap can occur within the banking system.  A trap occurs either because the banks 
desire to hold more reserves or because the public is unwilling to borrow.6  The term “liquidity 
trap” has also evolved over time.  Its meaning today is different than when it was first coined by 
Dennis Robertson in 1936.7
Demand for Money Liquidity Trap 
  I will first discuss a “liquidity trap” with respect to the demand for 
money. 
“A liquidity trap is defined as a situation in which the short-term nominal interest rate is 
zero.  In this case, many argue, that increasing the quantity of money in circulation has no effect 
on either output or prices.”8
M = quantity of money 
  This idea originated with John Maynard Keynes during the Great 
Depression and is contrasted with the quantity theory of money.  The quantity theory of money 
uses the equation of exchange, MV = PQ where 
V  = velocity of money 
P  = price level 
Q = the quantity of output  
to relate changes in the money supply to changes in prices and output.  If the money supply (M) 
increases and velocity (V) is constant, then nominal GDP (PQ) must increase. 
                                                 
5 Ben Bernanke, “Liquidity Provision by the Federal Reserve”, a speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta Financial Conference, Sea Island Georgia, May 29, 2008. 
6 Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, “Liquidity Traps for Money, Bank Credit, and Interest Rates,” 
Journal of Political Economy, January/February 1968, 76, (1) pp.1-37. 
7 Mauro Boianovsky, The IS-LM Model and the Liquidity Trap Concept: From Hicks to Krugman: History 
of Political Economy Conference on “The IS/LM Model: Its Rise, Fall, and Strange Persistence”, Duke University, 
25-27 April 2003. 
8 Gauti, B. Eggertsson, “Liquidity Trap”, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition. 
Eds. Steven Nidurlauf and Lawrence E. Blume.  Palgrave Macmillion, 2008. 
 4 
The Keynesian theory, on the other hand, implies that the money supply (M) affects 
prices (P) and output (Q) through nominal interest rates.  Increasing the money supply reduces 
interest rates through the money demand equation. 
Money Demand Function 
In the money demand equation there is an inverse relationship between the interest rate 
and the quantity of money demanded, as shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1 The Money Demand Function 
 
 
The interest rate is the opportunity cost of holding money.  At a low interest rate, holding 
wealth in the form of money is rational, as the income foregone is minimal.  However, at a 
higher interest rate, the amount of income foregone in holding money could be considerable.  
The higher the interest rate, the more income foregone, therefore less money is willingly held.  
The downward slope of the money demand curve (Dm), in the above figure, shows the inverse 
relationship between interest rates and the quantity of money demanded.9
The slope of the demand for money curve plays an important role in macroeconomics, 
because the slope will determine whether monetary policy or fiscal policy exerts more influence 
 
                                                 
9 William Boyes and Michael Melvin, Macroeconomics, 7th ed. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 2008), p. 334. 
 5 
on aggregate demand.  Keynesians, supporters of Keynesian theory, believe that fiscal policy 
plays a greater role influencing aggregate demand. They believe that the quantity of money 
demanded is sensitive to the interest rate, and that the curve shifts as it reacts to various 
economic events making it volatile.  Those that believe monetary policy has a greater influence 
on aggregate demand, otherwise known as monetarists, believe that the demand for money curve 
is nearly vertical and quite stable.  Therefore, the interest elasticity of demand also plays an 
important role. Keynesians believe, especially in a low interest rate environment, that elasticity 
of demand for money is quite high (-0.5 to -1.0), while monetarists believe that the elasticity is 
quite low (-0.1 to -0.3).10
Most economists believe that the demand for money (the reason people hold money), and 
by extension the slope of the demand curve, is influenced by the transaction, precautionary and 
speculative demand for money, along with institutional factors such as credit cards and the 
frequency of paydays. Of note, however, is the speculative demand for money.  This demand is 
created by uncertainty about the value of other assets. If you want to buy stock, but you believe 
the price is going to fall, you hold the money pending a better opportunity.  In the case of bonds, 
the decision is similar; one must decide when to buy bonds and when to hold onto money. 
Keynes analyzed this dilemma in the “context of an individual confronted with an alternative of 
investing wealth in government bonds or holding the wealth in the form of noninterest-earning 
money balances.”
   The actual shape of today’s curve (quantity of money in relationship 
to interest rates) and the shifting of this curve, along with the elasticity of demand, will be shown 
in the next chapter. 
11
i
RP =
  In the case of a perpetual bond, like British consols, it is important to note 
the relationship between bond prices and bond yields (interest rates), as depicted in the following 
equation. 
 
where: 
P is the price of the bond 
R is the constant annual return 
 i is the current bond yield and current yield of other assets 
                                                 
10 Lloyd B. Thomas, Jr., Money, Banking, and Economic Activity,  third edition. Prentice-Hall Inc.1986, p. 
343. 
11 Ibid., p.346. 
 6 
 
As such, bond prices are inversely proportional to yield or the interest rate.  Consequently, when 
interest rates are low (near 2 percent in the case of Keynes’ analysis) or near zero in today’s 
environment, investors would believe that the rate can only go higher in the future.  This would 
result in bond prices falling.  Accordingly, investors would stay clear of bonds and hold their 
financial wealth in the form of money. Therefore, according to Keynes, the lower the current 
interest rate the lower the demand for bonds, and the greater the demand for money.  Keynes 
referred to this as “liquidity preference” and a graphical depiction of it is provided in Figure 2 
below. 
 
Figure 2 Liquidity Preference 
 
This graph shows that, at some low interest rate, the speculative demand for money, or as 
some analysts prefer the “interest-sensitive portion of demand for money”, becomes perfectly 
elastic with respect to the interest rate.  At some low interest rate, all
Money Supply Function 
 investors would believe 
interest rates will only rise in the future (bond prices fall) and would therefore liquidate all bonds 
and hold all financial wealth in money.   
The Federal Reserve is responsible for determining the quantity of money supplied.  
Because the Fed can choose the quantity of money supplied, means that the money supply 
 7 
function by itself is independent of the interest rate.  Figure 3 illustrates the money supply 
function.12
Figure 3 The Money Supply Function 
 
 
 
In the figure, the money supply is $300 million at all interest rate levels.  If the Fed 
increases the money supply, the vertical money supply function shifts to the right.  If the Fed 
decreases the money supply, the function shifts to the left. 
Combining the money demand function with the money supply function shows how an 
increase in the money supply causes the interest rate to fall.  See Figure 4 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Some economists depict the money supply function as upward sloping as opposed to vertical.  Their 
rationale is that bank demand for excess reserves is negatively related to interest rates.  Banks are more aggressive in 
lowering excess reserves (expanding loans and security holdings) as interest rate increases. 
 8 
Figure 4 Money Supply Increases and Interest Rate Falls 
 
As the money supply increases from Sm1 to Sm2, the equilibrium rate of interest falls 
from i1 to i2.  This is the cornerstone of Keynes model. “In Keynes view, if a change in the 
money supply is to influence economic activity, it must do so via its impact on interest rates.”13
 
  
This is readily seen in Figure 5 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Lloyd B. Thomas, Jr., Money, Banking, and Economic Activity, third edition. Prentice-Hall Inc., p. 349. 
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Figure 5 Keynesian Model 
 
In the figure above, as the money supply increases from M1 to M2, the interest rate 
declines from i1 to i2.  However, note that when interest rates are low and the demand for money 
is perfectly elastic, the increase in money supply has no effect on the interest rate.  This is shown 
when M3 increases to M4; the interest rate remains constant at i3
↑
. In terms of MV = PQ, this 
means as M  increases, V ↓  decreases proportionately. So, MV or aggregate demand, is 
unaffected by the expansion of the money supply when the money demand curve is perfectly 
elastic. The extra money supplied by the Federal Reserve is held in the form of speculative 
money; none of the money is spent. This is why Keynes’ believed that monetary policy is 
ineffective when interest rates are low, and the economy is caught in a “liquidity trap”. 
However, in normal times when the money demand curve is not perfectly elastic, lower 
interest rates stimulate spending and thus output.  This is shown below in Figure 6.   
 
 10 
Figure 6 Spending and Output Increases 
 
     
In Figure 6(a) you can see the effect of lower interest rates on investment spending.  As 
the interest rate falls from i1 to i2, investment increases from I1 to I2.  When spending increases, 
aggregate demand (AD) in figure 6(b) increases, shifting the AD curve rightward and increasing 
output from Y1 to Y2
Even though increasing the money supply normally reduces interest rates through the 
money demand equation, the interest rate can never go below zero percent.  No one will lend 
money unless they get back, as a minimum, the amount they loaned.  A negative interest rate 
would imply banks paying borrowers to take out loans.  Therefore, once the Federal Reserve has 
increased the money supply to the point of lowering interest rates to zero, there would no longer 
be an impact on prices or output.  In fact, in Keynes’ original work, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money, it was suggested that a trap would occur at an interest rate of 
perhaps 2 percent, rather than at zero percent.  Consequently, further increases in the money 
supply will be useless, and thus a “liquidity trap” will exist rendering monetary policy 
ineffective, as was previously shown in Figure 5. 
. 
A common approach for discussing a “liquidity trap” is through the use of the IS-LM 
model.  The IS-LM model provides a framework for analyzing aggregate demand. It shows what 
 11 
determines output for a given price level by analyzing the interaction between the goods and 
services market and the money market.14
IS-LM Derivation Method 1 
  As there are different meanings for “liquidity” and 
different meanings for “liquidity trap”, there are different approaches to developing the IS and 
LM curves in the IS-LM Model. The results are the same, which will become apparent as I show 
two derivations of the IS-LM curves for completeness and understanding. I will call the two 
different approaches to deriving the IS-LM curves simply, method 1 and method 2. 
The following figure expresses that the quantity of money balances demanded, must 
equal the quantity of money balances supplied. 
The LM Curve 
Figure 7 Method 1 Derivation of LM Curve15 
 
The speculative (or interest-sensitive portion of the) money demand function is shown in 
the 1st quadrant of Figure 7.  The 3rd
                                                 
14 N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics 5th ed., (Worth Publishers, New York, 2003) p. 531. 
 quadrant shows the transactions demand and precautionary 
15 Lloyd B. Thomas, Jr., Money, Banking, and Economic Activity, third edition. Prentice-Hall Inc., p 408 
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demand for money and is designated LT.  It is a positive function of GDP. Quadrant 2 shows 
different combinations of the existing money supply consisting of speculative holdings (LS) and 
precautionary and transaction demand balances (LT
From Figure 7 it can be seen that the LM curve is made up from the demand for money 
(transaction, precautionary and speculative) and the money supply.  It portrays the relationship 
between interest rates and GDP in equilibrium in the market for money. 
). The LM curve is shown in quadrant 4 and 
is derived from the three other quadrants.  The LM curve depicts all combinations of interest 
rates (i) and income levels (GDP) that are consistent with equilibrium in the market for money. 
As an example, starting with the 1st quadrant, suppose the interest rate is 10 percent. The 
amount of money to satisfy the speculative demand for money is $50 billion. Quadrant 2 shows 
that, given the existing money supply of $150 billion, $100 billion is available to finance 
transactions and precautionary money demand. Quadrant 3 shows that, if LT
If the interest rate falls to 5 percent, quadrant 1 shows that speculative money demand 
increases.  Given the existing money supply, fewer funds are available to satisfy transactions and 
precautionary motives.  This, in turn, indicates that GDP must be lower in equilibrium (point B).  
Hence, the LM curve is an upward-sloping function of the interest rate. 
 is to be $100 
billion, then GDP must be $500 billion.  Therefore, a 10 percent interest rate in combination with 
$100 billion GDP will result in equilibrium. This is depicted as point A in quadrant 4 on the LM 
curve. 
It can be seen that the LM curve depends upon the money supply and the demand for 
money.  A change in the money supply or demand for money will result a change in the LM 
curve’s position. A change in the slopes of the speculative and/or precautionary demand for 
money will change the slope of the LM curve. 
The IS Curve 
The IS curve represents the various combinations of interest rates and levels of GDP that 
satisfies the state of equilibrium in the goods and services market. In a three-sector model, with 
no foreign trade, equilibrium occurs where S + T = I + G.  That is, where leakages from income, 
in the form of Savings and Taxes (S+T), are offset by injections in spending by investments and 
government spending (I+G). 
 13 
In quadrant (1) of Figure 8, I + G is a downward-sloping function of the interest rate. The 
lower the interest rate the greater the spending. To be in balance, the lower the interest rate, the 
higher S+T must be.   
 
Figure 8 Method 1 Derivation of IS Curve16 
 
 
 
The following example shows the derivation of the IS curve. Starting in quadrant (1), an 
interest rate of 10 percent implies spending (I+G) of $200B.  If I+G is $200B, then to be in 
equilibrium, S+T must be $200B in quadrant (3).  Subsequently quadrant (4) shows an 
equilibrium on the IS curve at an interest rate of 10 percent and a GDP of $1250B. 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 411. 
 14 
The IS curve will shift rightward when any event shifts I+G rightward or S+T rightward.  
GDP in turn would expand.  The IS curve will shift leftward when any event shifts I+G or S+T 
leftward. GDP would then contract. 
General Equilibrium 
It has been shown that there are an infinite number of possible combinations of interest 
rate and GDP levels that result in money market equilibrium. This is represented by a positive 
sloping LM curve.  Likewise, it has been shown that there are an infinite number of possible 
combinations of interest rate and GDP levels that result in goods and services equilibrium. This 
is represented by a negative sloping IS curve.  General equilibrium can be shown by the 
intersection of the IS-LM curves. This is depicted in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 Method 1 General Equilibrium 
 
At the intersection of IS and LM the money market and the goods and services market are 
in equilibrium. 
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IS-LM Derivation Method 2 
The IS Curve 
As was previously mentioned in Method 1, in the IS-LM model, the IS (investment-
saving) curve plots the relationship between interest rate and the level of output in the goods and 
services market.  It is derived from the investment function, Figure 6(a), and the Keynesian 
Cross.  The Keynesian Cross is a simple model of Keynes theory on national income.  Keynes 
ideas, as outlined in his The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), 
proposed that an economy’s income was in the short run, determined largely by the desire to 
spend by households, firms, and the government. If there is idle capacity in the economy, the 
more people want to spend, and the more goods and services firms can sell.  The more firms can 
sell, the more output they will choose to produce, and the more workers they will choose to hire.  
Thus, the problem during recessions and depressions, according to Keynes, was inadequate 
spending.17
 
   The Keynesian Cross is a depiction of intended expenditure (the amount 
households, firms, and government plan to spend on goods and services) versus the nation’s level 
of output and income.  This is shown in Figure 10 below, with planned expenditures on the 
vertical axis and actual output and income on the horizontal axis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics 5th ed., (Worth Publishers, New York, 2003) p. 259. 
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Figure 10 Keynesian Cross 
 
Combining the Investment Function, Figure 6(a), with the Keynesian Cross, Figure 10, 
one can derive the IS curve, as shown in Figure 11 below. 
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Figure 11 Method 2 Derivation of IS Curve 
 
Figure 11(a) shows the investment function: an increase in the interest rate from i1 to i2 
reduces planned investment from I1 to I2.  Figure 11(b) shows the Keynesian Cross: a decrease 
in planned investment from I1 to I2 shifts the planned expenditure function downward and 
thereby reduces income from Y1 to Y2
The LM Curve 
.  Figure 11(c) shows the IS curve summarizing this 
relationship between interest rate and income: the higher the interest rate, the lower the level of 
output and income. 
In the IS-LM model, the LM curve plots the relationship between the interest rate and the 
level of income or GDP (as in method 1), which arises in the market for money balances (money 
market).  “In his classic work, “The General Theory”, Keynes offered his view of how the 
interest rate is determined in the short run.  That explanation is called the theory of liquidity 
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preference, because it posits that the interest rate adjusts to balance the supply and demand for 
the economy’s most liquid asset-money.  Just as the Keynesian cross is a building block for the 
IS curve, the theory of liquidity preference is the building block for the LM curve.”18
 
  The theory 
of liquidity preference says that the supply and demand for money balances determines the 
interest rate.  This is shown in Figure 12 below. 
Figure 12 Liquidity Preference 
 
The supply curve for money balances is vertical, because we assume the supply does not 
depend on the interest rate.  The demand curve for money balances is downward sloping, 
because higher interest rates raise the cost of holding money and thus lower the quantity 
demanded.  The equilibrium interest rate is where the quantity of money balances demanded 
equals the quantity of money balances supplied. 
Now that it has been shown how the interest rate is determined, the theory of liquidity 
preference can be used to show how the interest rate responds to changes in the money supply.  
This is shown below in Figure 13. 
 
                                                 
18 Ibid. p. 271. 
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Figure 13 Increase in the Money Supply Under Liquidity Preference 
 
If the price level P is fixed, an increase in the money supply from M1 to M2 increases in 
the supply of money balances (M/P).  At i1, people are initially holding more money than they 
desire relative to bonds and other debt instruments.  They use these excess money balances to 
buy bonds, driving up bond prices and reducing yields (the “interest rate”).  The equilibrium rate 
therefore falls from i1 to i2,
Having shown how the theory of liquidity preference determines the interest rate, the LM 
curve can now be developed.  The demand for money depends on income, as well as interest 
rates.  Money demand varies directly with nominal income. As income increases, more 
transactions are carried out and more money is required to finance those transactions. Therefore, 
the greater nominal income, the greater the demand for money.  The increase in income shifts the 
demand for money curve upward, raising interest rates as shown below in Figure 14. 
 at which point the quantity of money demanded has caught up with 
the increased supply of money. 
 
 
 
 
 
 20 
Figure 14 Increase in Income 
 
With the supply of money balances unchanged, higher income leads to a higher interest 
rate. 
The LM curve plots the relationship combinations of the levels of income and interest rate 
that would yield equilibrium in the market for money.  The higher the level of income, the higher 
the demand for money, the higher the interest rate must be to produce equilibrium.  This results 
in the LM curve sloping upward.  This is shown below in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15 Method 2 Derivation of LM Curve  
 
Figure 15(a) shows the effect an increase in income has on interest rates.  Figure 15(b) 
shows the LM curve summarizing this relationship between interest rate (i) and income (I): the 
higher the level of income, the higher the interest rate must be, given the existing money supply. 
General Equilibrium 
The IS-LM curves are shown together in Figure 16 below. 
Figure 16 IS-LM Curve 
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The IS-LM model joins the Keynesian Cross with the theory of liquidity preference.  The 
IS curve shows all combinations of interest rate levels and income levels that satisfy equilibrium 
in the goods and services market. The LM curve shows all combinations of interest rate levels 
and income levels that satisfy equilibrium in the money market.  The intersection of the IS-LM 
curves shows the interest rate and income that satisfy equilibrium in both markets. Note that the 
general equilibrium outcome is exactly the same for method 2 as it was for method 1. 
Expansionary Monetary Policy 
An expansionary monetary policy, depicted by an increase in the money supply is shown 
in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17 Expansionary Monetary Policy 
 
An increase in the money supply raises money balances, shifts the LM curve rightward, 
lowers the interest rate, and raises income.  Consequently, an increase in the money supply shifts 
the aggregate demand curve to the right, as shown in Figure 18 below. 
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Figure 18 Aggregate Demand 
 
 
“Liquidity Trap” 
Based on the explanations thus far, it is now possible to show how a “liquidity trap” can 
be depicted in the IS-LM model.  This is shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 IS-LM Liquidity Trap 
 
 
As the money supply M increases the LM curve shifts from LM1 to LM2. However, given 
the position of the IS Curve and the shape of the LM Curve, the interest rate i1
“according to the IS-LM model, expansionary monetary policy 
works by reducing interest rates and stimulating investment spending.  But 
if interest rates have already fallen almost to zero, then perhaps monetary 
policy is no longer effective.  Nominal interest rates cannot fall below 
zero:  rather than making a loan at a negative nominal interest rate, a 
person would simply hold cash.  In this environment, expansionary policy 
raises the supply of money, making the public more liquid, but because 
interest rates can’t fall any further, the extra liquidity might not have any 
effect.  Aggregate demand, production, and employment may be “trapped” 
at low levels.”
 does not decrease 
and income does not increase, resulting in a “liquidity trap”.  The IS-LM model is usually used to 
discuss a “liquidity trap” because 
19
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid. p. 303. 
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Bank “Liquidity Trap” 
Unlike a demand for money liquidity trap, a bank “liquidity trap” is a “potential situation 
in which bank demand for excess reserves is perfectly elastic with respect to the interest rate, 
rendering the central bank incapable of increasing the money supply”.20
 
  In a bank liquidity trap, 
any additional excess reserves provided by the central bank are hoarded by banks, rather than 
being used to expand loans or security holdings.  A graphical depiction of the relationship 
between interest rates and bank demand for excess reserves is displayed in Figure 20 below. 
Figure 20 Bank Demand for Excess Reserves 
 
 
If we combine the above graph depicting excess reserves with an increase in the bank 
reserves by the Federal Reserve, we can see that the increase in reserves has no effect on the 
money supply, again rendering monetary policy ineffective.  This is shown in Figure 21 below. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Lloyd B. Thomas, Money, Banking and Financial Markets (Thomson, South-Western, 2006), p.386. 
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Figure 21 Supply and Demand for Bank Excess Reserves 
 
 
The reason why the bank demand curves for excess reserves become perfectly elastic as 
depicted above, is that at some low interest rate the risk associated with loaning the reserves and 
the transaction costs associated with using the reserves to buy government securities outweighs 
the meager expected rate of return (the interest rate). 
Reasons Why Banks Hold More Money 
The Federal Reserve controls the money supply through its ability to influence bank 
reserves and money creating power of banks.  This can be expressed by a simple equation 
BmM ⋅= , where M is the money supply, m is the money supply multiplier and B is the 
monetary base.  The money supply multiplier is the ratio of the money supply to the monetary 
base.  The monetary base consists of bank reserves and currency held by the public.  The Federal 
Reserve normally manipulates the money supply through open market operations (the buying 
and selling of government bonds) that affect the monetary base.  Banks are required to maintain 
a level of reserves (vault cash or deposit with the Federal Reserve).  When the Federal Reserve 
increases the monetary base, the money supply increases by the multiplier, m times the increase 
in the base.  Banks traditionally loan out almost all reserves in excess of the required amount, 
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because normally the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves is significant.21  However, 
when nominal interest rates are zero or close to zero, the opportunity cost of holding excess 
reserves becomes zero.  Compounding this situation is the fact that bank precautionary hoarding 
may occur, along with tightened lending standards.  Precautionary hoarding occurs when 
financial intermediaries feel that they may need their own funds due to potential shocks to the 
economy, or if outside funding is expected to be difficult to obtain.22
How the Meaning of “Liquidity Trap” Has Changed Over Time. 
  Therefore, banks tend to 
hold excess reserves and the demand curve for excess reserves becomes highly elastic, at some 
low, positive interest rate, as is depicted above in Figure 21. 
As quoted earlier, the phrase “liquidity trap” was coined by Sir Dennis Robertson, an 
English economist and colleague of John Maynard Keynes.  Robertson used the phrase “liquidity 
trap” in critiquing Keynes’ idea of liquidity preference that Keynes used in his classical work 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936).  Robertson’s phrase “liquidity 
trap” was originally invented to illustrate the influence of a negatively sloped money demand on 
the saving-investment process, rather than a perfectly elastic demand for money, as the term is 
noted for today.23
Most of the “liquidity trap” literature associated with Keynes and another colleague of 
Keynes, Sir John R. Hicks, concerned the existence of a positive floor to the interest rate, not the 
zero or close to zero interest rate the liquidity trap is associated with today.
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21 The degree of significance has declined as the Federal Reserve has started paying some interest on 
required bank reserves and excess bank reserves as of October, 2008. The interest rate paid on required reserve 
balances is determined by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and is intended to remove part of the implicit tax 
that reserve requirements impose on depository institutions. The interest rate paid on excess reserve balances is also 
determined by the Board of Governors. Paying interest on excess balances is intended to establish a lower bound on 
the federal funds rate by lessening the incentive for institutions to trade balances in the fed funds market at rates 
much below the rate paid on excess balances. Paying interest on excess balances will permit the Federal Reserve to 
provide sufficient liquidity to support financial stability while conducting monetary policy in support of maximum 
employment and price stability goals.  
  It is Hicks and 
Alvin H. Hansen that are credited with developing the IS-LM model.  It has been the model that 
has helped explain and espouse Keynesian economic policies. 
22 Markus K. Bunnermeier, “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 23, No.1 (Winter 2009) 95.   
23 Mauro Boianovsky, The IS-LM Model and the Liquidity Trap Concept: From Hicks to Krugman: History 
of Political Economy Conference on “The IS/LM Model: Its Rise, Fall and Strange Persistence”, Duke University, 
25-27 April 2003, p. 15. 
24 Ibid. p. 2. 
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The ideas that underlie the “liquidity trap” were conceived in the Great Depression when 
short-term nominal interest rates were close to zero. As the memory of the Great Depression 
faded over time, and with inflation becoming the norm in the industrialized world following 
World War II, monetary policy, in a deflationary environment, largely remained the subject only 
of historical inquiries.25
Nevertheless, the liquidity trap received much more attention in the late 1990’s as the 
Japanese financial crisis unfolded along with the availability of new economic data.  During the 
crisis, Japanese interest rates were essentially zero for most of the late 1990’s. The Bank of Japan 
more than doubled the monetary base, yet output remained stagnant. 
 
With the Japanese crisis a modern view of a liquidity trap emerged.  The modern view 
relies on economic models where aggregate demand depends on both current and expected future 
real interest rates, rather than simply the current rate, as with the traditional Keynesian economic 
models.  
 “The aggregate demand relationship that underlies the model is usually expressed 
by a consumption Euler equation, derived from the maximization problem of a 
representative household.  On the assumption that all output is consumed, that 
equation can be approximated as: 
 
)( 11
e
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      where Yt is the deviation of output from the steady state, it is the short-term nominal 
interest rate, πt is inflation, Et etris an expectations operator and   is an exogenous 
shock process (which can be due to host of factors).  This equation says that the 
current demand depends on expectations of future output (because spending depends 
on expected future income) and the real interest rate which is the difference between 
the nominal interest rate and expected future inflation (because lower real interest 
rates make spending today relatively cheaper than future spending).”26
 
   
     The importance of the equation is that it shows that monetary policy today might still be 
effective even if current interest rates are zero. Monetary policies would work through future 
expected inflation and thus future interest rates.  The catch is that monetary policy must shape 
peoples expectations about future inflation. 
                                                 
25 Athanasios Orphanides, “Monetary Policy in Deflation:  The Liquidity Trap in History and Practice”, 
The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, vol. 15 (1) pp 101-124, March 2004. 
26 Gauti, B. Eggertsson, “Liquidity Trap”, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition.  
Eds. Steven Nidurlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillion, 2008. 
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Nobel economist Paul Krugman established in his May 1998 article, It’s baaack! Japan’s 
slump and the return of the liquidity trap that Japan’s monetary easing (near-zero interest rates 
and Bank of Japan’s balance sheet expansion by 50 percent per annum in 1998) failed because 
the Bank of Japan was unable to change the public’s expectations about future inflation.  When 
nominal interest rates are near zero, expected inflation needs to be positive to keep ex ante real 
interest rates sufficiently low and thus impact private spending and aggregate demand.  When, 
the public expects the central bank to maintain price stability, as the Japanese populace did with 
the Bank of Japan, then inflation expectations remain very low resulting in ex ante real interest 
rates being too high to spur spending by the public.  This failure to initiate an increase in 
aggregate demand renders monetary policy ineffective. 
Accordingly, the only way out of a liquidity trap is to raise inflationary expectations.  
This is possible by government increasing deficit spending with fiscal policy or with 
“irresponsible monetary policy” – that is, convincing the public that monetary expansion is not 
merely temporary and that the central bank will not reverse its policy of monetary expansion 
when prices begin to rise.27
Theory Review 
 
Normally, the Federal Reserve can stimulate the economy by increasing the monetary 
base and lowering interest rates.  Typically these actions, increase borrowing, investment, and 
aggregate spending.  However, when interest rates are near zero, the Federal Reserve can no 
longer lower interest rates to stimulate the economy.  The Federal Reserve can increase the 
monetary base.  This money must find its way into the economy, which is normally 
accomplished through the banks. However, the banks are unwilling to lend, so the newly created 
liquidity is trapped behind unwilling bank lenders, thus forming the liquidity trap.28
                                                 
27 Paul Krugman, “It’s baaack! Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap.  Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 1998 (2). 137-187. 
  Therefore, 
when nominal interest rates are close to zero, the opportunity cost of holding money becomes 
negligible and banks, firms and individuals hold more money than they need for transaction 
purposes.  Traditional monetary policy becomes ineffective in stimulating the economy because 
the money creation process does not function.  In turn, the liquidity trap brings about inability to 
combat deflation, i.e. a continuous decline in prices.  When deflation is persistent, even if 
28 E. Ralph Hostetter, “Avoiding a Liquidity Trap”, DC Journal, 22 January 2009. 
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combined with an extremely low interest rate, a floor on real interest rates creates a vicious cycle 
of output stagnation and further expectations of deflation that perpetuates high real interest rates 
and continuing economic stagnation.29
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Hiro Ito, “Liquidity Trap”, The Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy, Eds. Kenneth Reinert 
and Ramkishen Rajas, Princeton University Press, December 2008. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Is There Evidence of Liquidity Trap? 
I will now review recent data to shed light on the question whether the United States is in 
a “liquidity trap”.  
Demand for Money “Liquidity Trap” 
 Based on the presented explanations, the first requirement for a “liquidity trap” is that 
short term nominal interest rates be near zero.  The following data regarding the federal funds 
rate show that is in fact the case today. 
 
Figure 22 Federal Funds Rate 
 
 
 
In its effort to ward off a recession, the Federal Reserve started reducing its federal funds 
rate in August 2007.  It continued reducing the interest rate until it reached it’s historic lows on  
December 16, 2008 of a target rate between zero and quarter percentage point.  That target, of 
between zero and a quarter percentage point, has continued throughout 2009 to date (December 
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2009).  The Federal Reserve also reiterated, at its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
meeting in November of 2009 that it expects to keep the target rate between zero and a quarter 
percentage point for the foreseeable future. 
The second requirement for a money demand liquidity trap is that when the Federal 
Reserve increases the money supply, it has no effect on output or prices.  The following graph 
shows that the money supply (M2) has increased, indeed, at an above-trend pace since the 
beginning of 2008. M1 has also increased at an above-trend rate. 
 
Figure 23 M2 Money Supply 
 
 
The M2 monetary aggregate increased at a 10 percent annual rate during the second half 
of 2008 and 8.5 percent for the year as a whole.30
                                                 
30 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “part 2, Recent Financial and Economic 
Developments” Monetary Policy Report to Congress, February 2009,. p. 25-26. M2 consists of (1) currency outside 
the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and the vaults of depository institutions; (2) traveler's checks of nonbank 
issuers; (3) demand deposits at commercial banks (excluding those amounts held by depository institutions, the U.S. 
government, and foreign banks and official institutions) less cash items in the process of collection and Federal 
Reserve float; (4) other checkable deposits (negotiable order of withdrawal, or NOW, accounts and automatic 
transfer service accounts at depository institutions, credit union share draft accounts, and demand deposits at thrift 
institutions); (5) savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts); (6) small-denomination time deposits 
(time deposits in amounts of less than $100,000) less individual retirement account (IRA) and Keogh balances at 
depository institutions; and (7) balances in retail money market mutual funds less IRA and Keogh balances at money 
market mutual funds. 
 In its 21 July 2009 Monetary Policy Report to 
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the Congress, the Federal Reserve states that “the M2 monetary aggregate expanded at an annual 
rate of 7 ¾ percent during the first half of 2009.”31
 
 
Figure 24 Nominal GDP 
 
 
Figure 24 above shows that nominal GDP in the United States declined slightly in the 
third quarter of 2008 and then decreased at an annualized rate of 6.3 percent in the 4th quarter. 
The decline continued at a 6.4 percent annual rate in the 1st quarter of 2009 and at an annual rate 
of 1% in the second quarter of 2009. 32 This decrease occurred despite the sharp increase in the 
money supply and decrease in short term nominal interest rates. However, nominal GDP did 
increase at an annual rate of 2.8 percent in the third quarter of 2009. 33
 
  This increase in nominal 
GDP reflects upturns in personal consumption expenditures, exports, private inventory 
investment, federal government spending and residential fixed investment.    
 
                                                 
31 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “part 2, Recent Financial and Economic 
Developments” Monetary Policy Report to Congress,  July 21, 2009, p. 25. 
32 Bureau of Economic Analysis, “News Release” regarding National Income and Product Account Gross 
Domestic Product: Second Quarter 2009 (Advance Estimate), July 31, 2009. 
33 Bureau of Economic Analysis, “News Release” regarding National Income and Product Account Gross 
Domestic Product: Third Quarter 2009 (Advance Estimate), October 29, 2009. 
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Table 1 Equation of Exchange Variables 
FISCALYEAR GDP 
(IN BILLIONS) 
M2 
(IN BILLIONS) 
VELOCITY 
(GDP/M2) 
%Δ M2 %ΔV 
2006:1 13183.5 6647.9 1.983 ----------- ------ 
2006:2 13347.8 6743.5 1.979 1.43 -0.20 
2006:3 13452.9 6803.6 1.977 0.89 -0.10 
2006:4 13611.5 6879.1 1.979 1.11 0.10 
2007:1 13795.6 6994.0 1.972 1.67 -0.35 
2007:2 13997.2 7096.3 1.972 1.46 0.00 
2007:3 14179.9 7198.8 1.970 1.44 -0.01 
2007:4 14337.9 7298.4 1.965 1.38 -0.25 
2008:1 14373.9 7405.3 1.941 1.46 -1.22 
2008:2 14497.8 7560.2 1.918 2.09 -1.18 
2008:3 14546.7 7666.5 1.897 1.40 -1.09 
2008:4 14347.3 7744.1 1.853 1.01 -1.75 
2009:1 14178.0 8020.0 1.768 3.56 -4.59 
2009:2 14151.2 8278.2 1.709 3.21 -3.34 
       2009:3 14301.5 8360.2 1.711 0.99 0.12 
 
Although the equation of exchange is simply an identity, it is instructive to review the 
behavior of the variables in this equation. The above table created from FRED (Federal Reserve 
Economic Data) displays the equation of exchange variables from the first quarter of 2006 
(approximately a year before the start of the current recession) until the third quarter of 2009 (the 
latest data available).  M2 is the quarterly average of the monthly data reported in FRED.34
                                                 
34 M2 includes a broader set of financial assets held principally by households. M2 consists of M1 plus: (1) 
savings deposits (which include money market deposit accounts, or MMDAs); (2) small-denomination time deposits 
(time deposits in amounts of less than $100,000); and (3) balances in retail money market mutual funds (MMMFs). 
Seasonally adjusted M2 is computed by summing savings deposits, small-denomination time deposits, and retail 
MMMFs, each seasonally adjusted separately, and adding this result to seasonally adjusted M1.   
   The 
table shows that, as the Federal Reserve increased the money supply, the country’s nominal 
output (GDP) increased from 2006:1 until the 2008:3.  Subsequently, nominal GDP started to fall 
and continued to decline up until the third quarter of 2009, when it rose. In the context of the 
equation of exchange, the proximate cause of this decline in GDP is the decline in velocity. 
Velocity has decreased persistently throughout the range of data (until the third quarter 2009), 
slowly at first, and then considerably faster starting in 2008:1.  There are two particular items of 
note.  First, from 2008:3 through 2009:2, the percent decline of velocity was greater than the 
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percent increase in the money supply (M2).  This explains the decline in nominal GDP. 
Additionally, the drops in velocity are rates per quarter. This means that the annual rate of 
decline in velocity in 2009:1 was 18.4 percent per year!  Velocity decreased as households and 
firms increased money holdings relative to expenditures.   
A graphical depiction of the GDP and Velocity columns in the above table are provided 
in Figures 25 and 26 respectively.  In the three years ending in 2009:2, M2 velocity declined 
about 14 percent 
 
Figure 25 Nominal GDP 
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Figure 26 Velocity (GDP/M2) 
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The following graph also shows that despite an increase in the money supply and a 
decrease in interest rates, prices at the producer level have generally fallen.  The index declined 
from a high of 205.5 in July 2008 to 168.1 in March 2009, showing a fall in prices of 
approximately 18 percent in this 8-month period.  Prices have risen and fallen slightly since 
March 2009 with a measure of 174.6 as of September 2009, resulting in an overall decline of 
nearly 15 percent since the high of July 2008. 
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Figure 27 Producer Price Index  
 
 
These graphs suggest that monetary policy has been ineffective and is consistent with the 
hypothesis that a “liquidity trap” exists based on the typical understanding of the meaning 
“liquidity trap”.  Increases in the money stock engineered by the Federal Reserve have not 
resulted in an increase in aggregate expenditures. 
In chapter 1, it was stated that the slope of the demand for money curve plays an 
important role in macroeconomics because the slope determines whether monetary policy or 
fiscal policy exerts more influence on aggregate demand.  A graph depicting the recent 
relationship between the 3-Month Treasury bill rate and money balances using the same M2 data 
as in Table 1 is shown below. 
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Figure 28 Money and Interest Rates 2006:1-2009:3 
 
Supporters of Keynesian theory believe that fiscal policy plays a greater role than 
monetary policy in influencing aggregate demand in a low interest rate environment.  They 
believe that the quantity of money demanded is sensitive to the interest rate and that the money 
demand curve shifts as it reacts to various economic events, thus making velocity volatile.  
Those that believe monetary policy has a greater influence in shaping the aggregate demand 
curve, otherwise known as monetarists, believe that the demand for money curve is nearly 
vertical and quite stable. The above graph may lead one to believe that, in this financial crisis, 
the monetarists are correct. One may believe that monetary policy has had a greater influence in 
shaping the aggregate demand curve since the relationship curve shown above is nearly vertical.  
However, the demand for money depends also on other factors such as income and economic 
uncertainty. Consequently, it would be useful to analyze the interest elasticity of money demand 
to help determine if a “liquidity trap” truly exists. As referred to in Chapter 1, the interest 
elasticity of money demand plays an important role in macroeconomics. Keynesians believe that 
the interest elasticity of demand for money is relatively high (-0.5 to -1.0), while monetarists 
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believe that the elasticity is quite low (-0.1 to -0.3)35.  According to David E. W. Laidler “If the 
liquidity trap hypothesis is true, it must be the case that the interest elasticity of demand for 
money becomes greater as the rate of interest falls…” 36
∞→
∆
∆
i
DM
0
0
0
0
   In a liquidity trap the interest elasticity 
of demand goes to infinity at some very low interest rate, as the percent change in demand for 
money is divided by the percent change in interest rate, as shown by the following formula. 
 
Of note however, is Laidler’s follow on statement regarding this relationship. He states 
that “there appears to be little evidence that this is in fact the case.”37
Regression Analysis to Investigate Interest Elasticity of Money Demand 
  This statement not 
withstanding, regression analysis can be used to estimate the interest elasticity of demand for 
money, which in turn, will help determine the existence of a liquidity trap. 
Regression Procedure 
To determine the existence of a traditional demand for money liquidity trap, different 
regression iterations of the following equation were run. 
( ) ( ) ( )teInterestRagammaRiskdeltaGDPbetaalpha
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M  was determined by using monthly data for both M1 and M2.  Then, each was 
divided by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). CPI is a representative variable for Price (P). M2 
was used to be consistent with Table 1 and Figure 28.  However, M2 includes several highly 
liquid financial assets, such as savings deposits and money market mutual fund shares that pay 
interest. It is also a broader measure of money that is used when one wants to emphasize the 
store-of-value function of money.  Consequently, regressions were also run using M1, a measure 
                                                 
35 Lloyd B. Thomas, Jr., Money, Banking, and Economic Activity,  third edition. Prentice-Hall Inc.1986, p. 
343. 
36 David E. W. Laidler, Demand for Money Theories, Evidence & Problems, fourth edition. HarperCollins 
College Publishers. 1993, p. 150. 
37 Ibid., p. 150. 
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that includes currency, demand deposits and other checkable deposits that pay little to no interest 
and emphasizes the medium exchange function of money.   
Since GDP data are reported in FRED on a quarterly basis, monthly GDP data were 
estimated by using interpolation. The interest rate used was the 90-day Treasury bill yield. Risk, 
a gauge of economic uncertainty, was measured by using the difference between Moody’s Aaa 
corporate bond yield and Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield, as reported in FRED.  A priori, one 
expects the signs on beta, delta, and gamma to be positive, positive, and negative, respectively.  
Periods of different interest rates were used to observe how gamma changed when 
interest rates were relatively low, as compared to times when interest rates were higher. Data 
were chosen that went back fifteen years to 1994. Regressions were run using data through April 
2009. April of 2009 was the latest date that data were available for all variables, since GDP data, 
at the time, only existed for the first two quarters of 2009.   
The log-linear model with equation XY lnln 21 ββ +=   was used as the functional form.  
This is also known as the double-log form and is the most common functional form. In this form, 
the natural log of Y is the dependent variable and natural log of X is the independent variable. 
Generally, this functional form is used when slopes are not constant. This is the case for interest 
elasticity of demand for money and thus the reason for using this functional form.  Natural logs 
also make it easier to determine impacts in percentage terms. “If you run a double-log regression, 
the meaning of a slope coefficient is the percentage change in the dependent variable caused by a 
one percentage point increase in the independent variable, holding the other independent 
variables in the equation constant.  It’s because of this percentage change property that the slope 
coefficients in a double-log equation are elasticities.”38
Regression Results 
 
Regression results are reported in the following table. 
                                                 
38 A. H. Studenmund, Using Econometrics, A Practical Guide, fifth edition, Pearson Education Inc. 1996, 
p. 211. 
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Table 2 Estimation of Money Demand Model (January 1994- April 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by using the Newey-West method. 
Regression Analysis 
The most pertinent finding in the above table pertains to gamma. Gamma is an estimate 
of the interest elasticity of demand for real money balances (M/P). In a pure liquidity trap this 
would be negative infinity. Otherwise, as previously detailed by David Laidler, the interest 
elasticity of demand or gamma should increase (in absolute terms) as interest rates fall. This 
occurs for some of the regression iterations. For example, when comparing gamma for M1/P 
when interest rates were greater than 1 percent, with interest rates when they fell to less than or 
equal to 1 percent, the regression iteration 
teInterestRagammaalpha
P
M ln1ln +=  
ln M1/P = alpha + beta ln GDP + delta ln Risk + gamma ln Interest Rate 
 alpha ln GDP ln Baa-Aaa ln Interest 
 Rate 
# 
obs 
R
Interest 
Rates < 1% 
2 
1.945 (390.87)   -.028 (-9.48) 18 0.725 
3.007  (3.62) -.113 (-1.27)  -.038 (-4.28) 18 0.769 
1.796  (2.49) .016 (0.21) -.033 (-3.03) -.043 (-4.16) 18 0.804 
Interest 
Rates > 1% 
1.908 (221.84)   -.009 (1.36) 166 0.007 
3.225  (18.14) -.138 (-7.40)  -.017 (-2.59) 166 0.257 
2.817  (15.27) -.093 (-4.76) -.089 (-5.80) -.041 (-5.53) 166 0.322 
ln M2/P = alpha + beta ln GDP + delta ln Risk + gamma ln Interest Rate 
Interest 
Rates < 1% 
3.502 (369.38)   -.070 (-4.34) 18 0.764 
-1.785 (-1.72) .564  (5.07)  -.020 (-1.69) 18 0.952 
-.400   (-0.45) .416  (4.33) .038  (3.33) -.014 (-1.15) 18 0.960 
Interest 
Rates > 1% 
3.570 (227.37)   -.168 (-12.30) 166 0.311 
-2.150 (-30.61) .603  (79.87)  -0.48 (-15.56) 166 0.986 
-2.158 (-30.90) .604  (81.62) -.001 (-0.20) -.048 (-16.84) 166 0.986 
ln M1/P = alpha + beta ln GDP + delta ln Risk + gamma ln Interest Rate 
Interest 
Rates < 2% 
1.926 (443.85)   -.045 (-7.07) 50 0.600 
2.956   (10.46) -.109 (-3.64)  -.053 (-6.69) 50 0.658 
2.374   (9.47) -.046 (-1.72) -0.64 (-6.23) -.071 (-7.48) 50 0.796 
Interest 
Rates > 2% 
1.952  (58.49)   -.018 (-0.83) 134 0.005 
3.479  (17.54) -.156 (-7.87)  -.078 (-3.77) 134 0.311 
3.273  (13.21) -.134 (-5.45) -.038(-1.46) -0.081 (-.416) 134 0.318 
ln M2/P = alpha + beta ln GDP + delta ln Risk + gamma ln Interest Rate 
Interest 
Rates < 2% 
3.506 (516.98)   -0.67 (-6.01) 50 0.572 
-.540   (-3.51) .431  (26.22)  -.036 (-5.53) 50 0.966 
-.521   (-3.77) .428 (29.11) .002  (0.34) -0.035 (-5.11) 50 0.966 
Interest 
Rates > 2% 
3.774  (67.94)   -.299 (-8.18) 134 0.229 
-2.210 (-29.54) .612  (81.99)  -.063 (-9.62) 134 0.989 
-2.118 (-22.41) .603  (65.02) .017  (1.64) -.062 (-9.40) 134 0.990 
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 shows that gamma increased (in absolute terms) for all three iterations from -.009 to        
-.028, from -.017 to -.038 and from -.041 to -.043 respectively.  These low interest elasticities 
(fairly close to zero) do not confirm the existence of a liquidity trap. However, when comparing 
gamma for M1/P when interest rates were greater than 2 percent, with interest rates when they 
fell to less than or equal to 2 percent, there is only one iteration that increased and that was from 
-.018 to -.045.  This is not to be unexpected, as there is less likelihood of a liquidity trap at higher 
interest rates.  
Note that the coefficients on the ln GDP variable exhibit the expected sign in the M2/P 
regressions and exhibit very high t-statistics.  These coefficients range in magnitude from 
roughly 0.40 to 0.60, indicating that M2 is a normal good, confirming economies of scale in 
money balances.  As GDP rises over time, demand for M2 rises more slowly.  However, in the 
M1/P regressions, the signs on the estimated ln GDP coefficients are uniformly negative and 
often highly significant statistically. 
This result is likely picking up the action taken by the Federal Reserve to pump liquidity 
into financial markets since the beginning of the financial crisis. From January 2008 to 
September 2009, M1 increased more than 19 percent.  This is most likely the reason M1/P 
regressions are exhibiting the wrong sign on the GDP and risk variables. M2/P regression results 
are better. M2 has only grown by 11 percent over the same time period. This is probably because 
M2 has not been impacted as much by the Federal Reserve actions.   
The regressions indicate that the measure for risk, ln(Baa –Aaa) is statistically 
insignificant in the M2/P regressions, and exhibits the wrong sign in the M1/P regressions (and is 
sometimes statistically significant).  This may be because the risk variable (Baa-Aaa) and the 
loss of confidence that was occurring in the economy were not picking up the shifts that were 
occurring in the money demand function.  It is extremely difficult to disentangle the effect of 
very low interest rates from other forces causing increases in money demand here such as safe 
haven forces, as the stock market crashed (Dow Jones Industrial Averages fell from a high of 
nearly 14,000 in October of 2007 to a low of nearly 6600 the second week of March 2009) . 
Bank “Liquidity Trap” 
 What about a bank “liquidity trap”?  Previously, it was stated that a bank “liquidity trap” 
is a potential situation in which bank demand for excess reserves is perfectly elastic with respect 
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to the interest rate, rendering the central bank incapable of increasing the money supply. In this 
situation, all additional reserves injected into the banks by the Federal Reserve are simply held 
by the banks, rather than being used to extend credit.  The following graphs show this. Figure 29 
shows total bank reserves and figure 30 shows the excess reserves held by banks. 
Figure 29 Total Bank Reserves 
 
Figure 30 Excess Reserves 
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Clearly, banks started to rigorously hold excess reserves midway through 2008. They 
continue to do so as the nominal short-term interest rates have remained near zero and as the 
opportunity cost of holding excess reserves is extremely low.   
Banks also build up excess reserves if they cut back on their lending through a tightening 
of standards or for precautionary reasons.  The following graph shows that the amount of loans 
that banks have made has declined, even as excess reserves increased.  In fact, the decline started 
in earnest about the time the Federal Reserve lowered its interest rate target to between a quarter 
and zero percent.  In its February 2009 monetary report to Congress, the Board of Governors 
reported a decreased demand for credit in response to slowing business activity along with a 
tightening of lending standards.39  Additionally, the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
conducted in April 2009 “indicated that large fractions of banks continued to tighten lending 
standards and terms on loans to businesses and households over the preceding three months”.40
 
 
Figure 31 Amounts of Bank Loans 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “part 2, Recent Financial and Economic 
Developments” Monetary Policy Report to Congress, February 2009,  p.11. 
40 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “part 2, Recent Financial and Economic 
Developments” Monetary Policy Report to Congress, July 21, 2009, p. 24. 
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The next chart shows the increase in the monetary base by the Federal Reserve. 
According to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 
of February 2009, the monetary base increased swiftly because of the heavy use of the Federal 
Reserve’s liquidity programs. Credit extended through the Federal Reserve programs caused the 
balance sheet of the Federal Reserve to expand considerably.  In its July 21, 2009 report to 
Congress, the Federal Reserve noted that the monetary base continued to expand rapidly in the 
first quarter of 2009.  As discussed earlier, the Federal Reserve normally controls the money 
supply through its control over the monetary base. 
 
Figure 32 Monetary Base 
 
 
 The money supply (M2) can be written as the product of the monetary base (B) and a 
multiplier (m). The money supply multiplier can be found by dividing the money supply by the 
monetary base. 
B
Mm 2=  
  
 The recent behavior of the money multiplier is shown in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33 M2/Monetary Base 
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It is evident that there has been a huge decline in the money supply multiplier since 
August, 2008.  This is due to the unprecedented increase in bank willingness to hold excess 
reserves. 
If the data provided by the Federal Reserve regarding 3-Month Treasury bill interest rates 
and excess reserves are plotted, a graph depicting bank demand for excess reserves versus 
interest rates can be drawn.  From a traditional Keynesian viewpoint, as shown previously in 
Figure 21, such a graph will show that the bank demand curve for excess reserves will become 
extremely elastic, if in fact the economy is in a “banker’s liquidity trap”.   The following graph 
does just that.  Plotting monthly data from January 2007 through July 2009 shows that bank 
demand for excess reserves becomes highly elastic.   
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Figure 34 Keynesian View of Bank Demand for Excess Reserves 
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As was previously done with the demand for money liquidity trap, a regression analysis 
can be run to investigate whether a banker’s liquidity trap exists. 
Regression Analysis to Investigate Existence of a Bank Liquidity Trap 
Regression Procedure 
The procedure used to investigate a possible bank liquidity trap is similar to the one used 
for the demand for money liquidity trap.  A bank’s decision to hold excess reserves is governed 
by considerations of risk and opportunity cost.  The opportunity cost of holding excess reserves 
is interest income that could have been earned on these funds.  Several regression iterations of 
the following log-linear model equation were run. 
)ln()ln()ln( RateInterestgammaRiskbetaalphareservesExcess ++=  
Excess reserve data were taken from FRED for a fifteen year period from January 1994 
through April 2009, as was done in the demand for money liquidity trap regressions. We 
employed two variables as proxies for risk.  The Baa-Aaa yield differential and the variable VIX 
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were used.  The reason for this was to capture the economic uncertainty that the banks have been 
operating under.  The Baa-Aaa corporate bond yield differential is a proxy for perceived default 
risk in business loans.  An increase in this perceived risk leads banks to tighten lending standards 
and increase holdings of excess reserves. 
VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index.  The Chicago Board 
Options Exchange created VIX as measure of equity market volatility. VIX is computed real 
time throughout the trading day.  The computation of the value of VIX is based on the implied 
volatility of eight option series on the S&P 100 index.  The VIX is quoted in percentage points 
per annum. As an example, a VIX value of 20.23 represents an annualized implied volatility of 
20.23 percent.  The VIX is sometimes called the “investor fear index”, since investor uncertainty 
can lead to high market volatility.  Options are traded on the VIX, enabling additional hedging 
and speculation positions on volatility.  VIX is employed as a proxy representing economic 
uncertainty that influences bank demand for excess reserves. 
Regressions were run for the 90-day Treasury bill yields less than or equal to 1 percent, 
greater than 1 percent, less than or equal to 2 percent and greater than 2 percent as was done in 
the demand for money liquidity trap regressions.  However, additional regressions were run for 
all interest rates, including interest rates when they were higher at less than or equal to 4 percent 
and greater than 4 percent. This resulted in 184 observations. The main intent was to estimate 
gamma. We are particularly interested in the question of whether gamma increases in absolute 
values as interest rates decline. 
Regression Results 
Regression results are reported in the following table: 
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Table 3 Estimation of Banker's Liquidity Trap Model Jan 1994-April 2009 
ln Excess Reserves = alpha + beta lnRisk + gamma lnInterest Rate 
 alpha ln VIX ln Baa-Aaa ln Interest 
Rate 
# 
obs 
R
All  Interest 
Rates 
2 
1.810 (7.83)   -1.112 (-6.74) 184 0.544 
-.805   (-1.32) .826   (3.83)  -.959   (-7.04) 184 0.593 
1.446  (8.45)  1.582 (4.42) -.558   (-4.25) 184 0.617 
-.266   (-0.55) .561  (3.45) 1.302 (4.20) -.552   (-4.33) 184 0.637 
Interest 
Rates < 1% 
.928     (2.20)   -2.555  (-4.31) 18 0.726 
-11.49  (-9.09) 4.161 (9.46)  -1.063  (-3.43) 18 0.954 
.726     (3.03)  4.679 (8.16) -.248    (-0.80) 18 0.953 
-5.855  (-1.72) 2.238  (1.89) 2.359 (1.56) -.589    (-1.54) 18 0.963 
Interest 
Rates > 1% 
.827      (5.36)   -.359    (-3.50) 166 0.168 
.245      (0.81) .185    (1.39)  -.329    (-3.94) 166 0.187 
.719      (6.20)  .424    (2.35) -.205    (-3.59) 166 0.203 
.279      (0.95) .143    (1.15) .379    (2.32) -.199    (-3.53) 166 0.214 
Interest 
Rates < 2% 
1.357    (8.88)   -2.245 (-6.77) 50 0.736 
-5.783  (-3.98) 2.254  (4.81)  -1.706 (-6.10) 50 0.854 
.735      (5.09)  2.616  (5.68) -1.329  (-4.51) 50 0.866 
-2.532   (-1.69) 1.099  (2.22) 1.714  (4.48) -1.382  (-5.20) 50 0.878 
Interest 
Rates > 2% 
1.207    (4.28)   -.601    (-3.40) 134 0.179 
.801      (4.72) .146    (1.26)  -.611    (-3.38) 134 0.199 
1.149    (4.10)  .465    (4.20) -.470    (-2.68) 134 0.235 
.779      (5.05) .133    (1.16) .451    (3.97) -.484    (-2.62) 134 0.251 
Interest 
Rates < 4% 
1.726   (9.42)   -1.572 (-8.00) 82 0.600 
-2.456   (-1.97) 1.326  (3.23)  -1.235 (-7.38) 82 0.664 
1.258   (10.24)  2.077  (4.74) -.832     (-5.34) 82 0.696 
-.158    (-0.11) .477    (1.02) 1.689  (3.23) -.849     (-5.54) 82 0.701 
Interest 
Rates > 4% 
1.763    (3.10)   -.943     (-2.73) 102 0.113 
1.422    (2.54) .112    (1.64)  -.934     (-2.79) 102 0.134 
1.377    (2.57)  .448    (3.20) -.612     (-1.85) 102 0.193 
.965      (1.92) .130    (2.02) .468    (3.39) -.587     (-1.84) 102 0.221 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by using the Newey-West method. 
 
Regression Analysis 
Economic theory indicates the signs on beta and gamma are expected to be positive and 
negative, respectively.  The findings are consistent with this expectation, as all variables exhibit 
the expected signs and are in most instances statistically significant at conventional levels.  The 
key variable of interest is gamma, the interest elasticity of bank demand for excess reserves.  The 
banker’s liquidity trap hypothesis implies that this elasticity increases in absolute value as the 
interest rate declines and becomes infinitely large at some low interest rate (such as 0.5 or zero).  
While our estimates of gamma cannot confirm an infinite elasticity of demand, they do indicate 
that the absolute value of this elasticity increases as interest rates decline.  Using absolute values 
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for gamma it is noted that at interest rates above 4 percent, gamma ranges from 0.59 to 0.94.  At 
interest rates below 2 percent, gamma ranges from 1.33 to 2.25.  In the 18 months in which 
interest rates were below 1 percent, gamma estimate is as high as 2.55.  However, with only 18 
observations in which interest rates were extremely low, we may have a problem with degrees of 
freedom.  In all cases, the explanatory power of the model is appreciably higher in periods of 
lower interest rates.  Bankers do respond to changes in opportunity cost. With short-term interest 
rates very close to zero in the past year, the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves is 
extremely low. 
The risk variables show up as uniformly exhibiting the expected sign, indicating the 
demand curve for excess reserves shifts rightward, as expected, when banker’s perception of risk 
increases.  Because the Federal Reserve aggressively lowered interest rates at the same time 
major financial shocks were occurring in volatile years of 2008 and 2009, it is possible that 
multicollinearity exists in the regression equations, which may be influencing the estimates of 
the interest elasticity of demand for excess reserves.  Simultaneity bias may also be occurring 
(another term for simultaneity bias is “endogeneity”). This happens when there is a feedback 
relationship between the dependent variable and one or more of independent variables.  Many 
financial shocks and policy actions that occurred in 2008 and 2009 may have appreciably 
influenced the results reported in Table 3. Therefore, the model was re-estimated using data only 
from January 1994 through July 2007. These results are provided in the following table.  Note 
that the explanatory power of the model is much lower than when the observations after July 
2007 are included (Table 3).  The risk variables are often statistically insignificant in this period 
of high economic stability in which there was little variation in the amount of excess reserves.  
And gamma is statistically insignificant in periods in which interest rates were below 2 percent. 
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Table 4 Estimation of Banker's Liquidity Trap Model from Jan 1994-Jul 2007 
ln Excess Reserves = alpha + beta ln Risk + gamma ln Interest Rate 
 alpha ln VIX ln Baa-Aaa ln Interest 
Rate 
# 
obs 
R
Interest 
Rates < 1% 
2 
1.341 (3.56)   10.800 (2.55) 11 0.430 
-1.277(-0.44) .900  (0.86)  10.428 (2.49) 11 0.509 
1.464 (4.38)  1.041(2.35) 11.861(3.36) 11 0.645 
1.738 (0.50) -.092 (-0.08) 1.083 (1.70) 11.942 (3.23) 11 0.646 
Interest 
Rates > 1% 
.623   (10.07)   -.233   (-6.22) 152 0.130 
.478   (2.00) .046    (0.52)  -.227   (-7.32) 152 0.133 
.595  (9.26)  .175    (1.90) -.179   (-4.21) 152 0.141 
.495   (2.03) .032    (0.35) .166    (1.66) -.178   (-4.34) 152 0.142 
Interest 
Rates < 2% 
.492   (6.59)   -.167   (-0.97) 36 0.035 
.238   (0.79) .085    (0.93)  -.199   (-1.15) 36 0.045 
.492   (6.45)  -0.10 (-0.08) -.164  (-0.88) 36 0.545 
.083   (0.21) .137    (1.19) -.114 (-0.60) -.186   (-1.01) 36 0.052 
Interest 
Rates > 2% 
1.19   (3.53)   -.601   (-2.83) 127 0.175 
.851   (5.10) .133    (1.02)  -.626   (-2.71) 127 0.193 
1.216  (3.64)  .495    (4.12) -.512   (-2.55) 127 0.239 
.855   (5.72) .139    (1.08) .501    (4.10) -.537  (-2.45) 127 0.258 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by using the Newey-West method. 
 
The above results suggest that the previous results are heavily influenced by the 
observations after July 2007.  To estimate how much of the recent surge in excess reserves was 
due to low interest rates rather than other factors, a regression (not in log form) was run for the 
following equation. 
)()()( depositsdemandgammariskdeltayieldbetaalphaER +++=  Where ER 
represents excess reserves and gamma (demand deposits) was added to provide a scale factor.  
This covered the period of time before the financial crisis until the end of 2007 for all interest 
rates and interest rates less than or equal to 2 percent. The results are provided in the following 
table. 
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Table 5 Estimation of Banker's Liquidity Trap Model (Jan 1994-Dec 2007, non log form) 
Excess Reserves = alpha + beta (t-bill yield) + delta (risk) + gamma (deposits) 
 alpha beta 
(t-bill yield) 
delta 
 (VIX) 
 
delta  
(Baa-Aaa) 
gamma 
(demand deposits 
& other 
checkable 
deposits) 
gamma 
(demand 
deposits) 
# 
obs 
R
All 
2 
Interest 
Rates 
1.644 
(1.02) 
-.137 
 (-2.44) 
.028 
 (0.74) 
 -.0002 
 (-0.12) 
 168 0.047 
4.039 
(2.70) 
-.166 
(-1.92) 
 -.437 
(-0.86) 
-.002 
(-2.2) 
 168 0.037 
2.391 
(2.41) 
-.164 
(-1.98) 
.028 
(0.73) 
-.383 
(-0.85) 
-.0007 
(-0.52) 
 168 0.048 
1.541 
(1.10) 
-.137 
(-1.76) 
.029 
(1.00) 
  -.0001 
(-0.05) 
168 0.047 
2.259 
(2.25) 
-.148 
(-1.74) 
 -.002 
(-0.01) 
 -.0004 
(-0.12) 
168 0.028 
2.280 
(2.33) 
-.158 
(-1.69) 
.032 
(1.01) 
-.400 
(-0.97) 
 -.001 
(-0.42) 
168 0.048 
Interest 
Rates 
< 2% 
-2.198 
(-1.14) 
-.186 
(-0.77) 
.024 
(2.07) 
 .005 
(2.31) 
 36 0.115 
-1.818 
(-0.56) 
-.229 
(-1.04) 
 .604 
(0.94) 
.005 
(1.15) 
 36 0.105 
-5.683 
(-1.38) 
-.146 
(-0.67) 
.026 
(2.31) 
.680 
(1.03) 
.010 
(1.82) 
 36 0.153 
-2.051 
(-0.82) 
-.380 
(-1.63) 
.020 
(1.68) 
  .011 
(1.52) 
36 0.137 
-.367 
(-0.17) 
-.351 
(-1.30) 
 .245 
(0.65) 
 .006 
(1.07) 
36 0.104 
-2.056 
(-0.78) 
-.382 
(-1.39) 
.020 
(1.98) 
.013 
(0.04) 
 .011 
(1.51) 
36 0.137 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by using the Newey-West method. 
 
The above results again confirm that the regressions run through April 2009 are heavily 
influenced by the post 2007 observations. The t statistics and the R2
)( yieldbilltbetaalphaER −+=
s reported in Table 5 are very 
low.  Because there was little variation in excess reserves in this period, we extended our data 
sample back to 1970. Therefore, additional regressions were run using the following equations 
with 464 observations.  
 
)()( depositscheckableotheranddepositsdemandgammayieldbilltbetaalphaER +−+=  
)()( depositsdemandgammayieldbilltbetaalphaER +−+=  
where ER = Excess Reserves 
Given the unsatisfactory results reported in Table 5, we decided to enlarge the sample 
size to provide greater variability in the dependent and independent variables.  Observations 
were included in the analysis as far back as 1970. This was done to get a greater range in 
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fluctuations in the volume of excess reserves and most likely a stronger t-statistics and R2
 The results of these regressions are provided in the following table. 
s. 
Given the results reported in Table 5, we deleted the risk variables from the model. The time 
period through August 2008 was chosen to estimate the normal bank demand for excess reserves 
based on interest rates and aggregate demand deposits, and to estimate how much of the recent 
surge in excess reserves was due to factors other than low interest rates. With the commencement 
of Federal lending programs, excess reserves expanded tremendously in September 2008 (as 
previously shown in Figure 30).  Beta defines the effect of interest rates on bank demand for 
excess reserves, given the scale of bank deposits. For this reason the regressions were run using 
the long sample period from 1970 through August 2008. 
Table 6  Regressions from Jan 1970-Aug 2008 
Excess Reserves = alpha + beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (deposits) 
 
alpha beta (t bill yield) 
gamma 
 (demand deposits 
& other checkable 
deposits) 
gamma 
(demand deposits) 
# 
obs R
2 
1.697 (12.43) -.131 (-7.86)   464 0.133 
.269   (2.45) -.060 (-4.20) .002 (20.84)  464 0.259 
All 
Interest 
Rates -.286  (-2.45) -.076 (-6.60)  .005 (9.57) 464 0.246 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by using the Newey-West method.  
 As anticipated, the t-statistics and R2
This was accomplished by substituting the post August 2008 values of the Treasury bill 
yield, DDO, and DD into the three equations in Table 6 to estimate normal bank demand for 
excess reserves in the absence of extremely risky conditions.  The results are provided in     
Table 7. 
s are considerably higher and a better fit than those 
reported in Table 5. Beta and gamma exhibit expected signs and are statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  Therefore, based on traditional behavior of excess reserves, these results 
can be used to predict what the excess reserves would have been post August 2008 in the 
absence of the extraordinary shocks that likely shifted the banker’s demand curve for excess 
reserves. 
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Table 7 Predicted vs. Actual Excess Reserves 
Date Equation 
Predicted 
Excess 
Reserves 
(billions) 
Actual 
Excess 
Reserves 
(billions) 
2008:09 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.549 
60.054 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.331 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.345 
2008:10 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.609 
267.904 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.367 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.464 
2008:11 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.672 
559.039 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.399 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.732 
2008:12 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.693 
767.398 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.427 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 2.130 
2009:01 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.680 
798.233 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.409 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.836 
2009:02 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.658 
643.486 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.389 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.578 
2009:03 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.669 
724.632 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.401 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.681 
2009:04 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.676 
824.378 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.410 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.743 
2009:05 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.673 
844.100 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.407 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.728 
2009:06 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.673 
751.378 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.417 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.909 
2009:07 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.673 
733.008 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.417 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.902 
2009:08 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.675 
765.851 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.417 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.863 
2009:9 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) 1.681 
860.074 ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DDO) 0.424 
ER = alpha +beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (DD) 1.808 
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  Note: ER     = Excess Reserves 
            DDO = Demand Deposits and Other Checkable Deposits 
 DD    = Demand Deposits 
 
A visual depiction of the predicted versus actual excess reserves, using  
)()( DDgammayieldbilltbetaalphaER +−+=  
as the representative equation, is shown below.  
 
Figure 35 Predicted vs. Actual Excess Reserves 
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 The above results suggest that the recent bank holdings of extreme amounts of excess 
reserves are likely overwhelmingly due to factors other than low interest rates.  Treasury bill 
yields have typically been lower than 0.25 percent during the past year, explaining why banks 
may prefer to hold excess reserves rather than Treasury bills.  However, various bank loan rates 
and longer-term Treasury bond yields are much higher than Treasury bill yields.  Given the 
financial shocks of the past two years and the accompanying deterioration in capital accounts of 
many banks, bankers have severely tightened their lending standards.  They are simply not 
making loans to many business and household borrowers that banks traditionally accommodate.  
Banks are holding excess reserves rather than extending credit.  It appears that this, and to a 
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lesser extent, the extremely low yields on safe Treasury securities, accounts for the unwillingness 
of banks to use their excess reserves to purchase earning assets and extend credit. 
 To further explore the sensitivity of excess reserves to interest rates a graph plotting 
excess reserves and interest rates on the same timeline from January 1988 to August 2008 was 
created and is shown below. 
 
Figure 36 Excess Reserves and Interest Rates 
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 The spikes in excess reserves correlate to the times that the Federal Reserve pumped 
excess reserves into the economy to ensure liquidity.  The six highest spikes that occurred when 
interest rates were relatively high were December 1990, January 1991, February 1991, January 
2000, September 2001 and August 2007.  The first three spikes are associated with the Persian 
Gulf War.  The December 1990 spike is associated with the buildup of men and material for war, 
the January 1991 spike commenced with the beginning of the air war, and the February 1991 
spike correlates to the start of the land war.  The spike in January 2000 is associated with the turn 
of the millennium and fear of the “Y2K” crisis.  The biggest spike occurred in September 2001 
with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in 
Washington D.C.  The last point, August 2007, transpired when BNP Paribus was unable to 
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value mortgage backed securities and suspended calculation of net asset values (NAV) on funds.  
The Federal Reserve announced their readiness to provide liquidity as necessary.  A scatter plot 
using the same points as in the graph above and another scatter plot with the six points removed 
are shown in the next two figures. 
 
Figure 37 Scatter Plot 3-Month T-Bill vs. Excess Reserves/DDO 
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Figure 38 Scatter Plot 3-Month T-Bill rate vs. Excess Reserves/DDO with Pertinent Points 
Removed 
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 The above scatter plot with the six points removed results in a nonlinear bank demand for 
excess reserves curve that insinuates possibility of a bankers’ liquidity trap.  Regressions for 
tables 3 through 6 were redone in order to investigate this possibility.  Tables 3-5 changed 
considerably but not as noticeably as Table 6. This table involved dates that allowed the removal 
of all 6 points.  Old table 6, now labeled Table 8, and new table 6, now labeled Table 9 are 
shown below for comparison.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
Table 8  Regressions from Jan 1970-Aug 2008 
Excess Reserves = alpha + beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (deposits) 
 
alpha beta (t bill yield) 
gamma 
 (demand deposits 
& other checkable 
deposits) 
gamma 
(demand deposits) 
# 
obs R
2 
1.697 (12.43) -.131 (-7.86)   464 0.133 
.269   (2.45) -.060 (-4.20) .002 (20.84)  464 0.259 
All 
Interest 
Rates -.286  (-2.45) -.076 (-6.60)  .005 (9.57) 464 0.246 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by using the Newey-West method.  
 
Table 9 Regressions from Jan 1970-Aug 2008 less Dec 90, Jan 91, Feb 91, Jan 00, Sept 01, 
& Aug 07 
Excess Reserves = alpha + beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (deposits) 
 
alpha beta (t bill yield) 
gamma (demand 
deposits & other 
checkable 
deposits) 
gamma (demand 
deposits) 
# 
obs R
All 
2 
Interest 
Rates 
1.547 (28.86) -.115 (-15.64)   458 0.339 
  .186  (3.36) -.047 (-8.22) .002 (27.02)  458 0.721 
 -.235  (-2.62) -.066 (-10.20)  .005 (21.77) 458 0.644 
 
 Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by using the Newey-West method. 
 
 The dramatically improved results are clearly seen, particularly with the R2
 
s.  With these 
positive results regressions for the above table were run for interest rates greater than 3 percent 
and 4 percent as well as less than 3 percent and 4 percent.  The results are shown in the following 
table. 
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Table 10 Regressions from Jan 1970 – Aug 2008 less Dec 90, Jan 91, Feb 91, Jan 2000, Sep 
2001, Aug 2007 for 3% and 4% 
 
Excess Reserves = alpha + beta (t-bill yield) + gamma (deposits) 
 
alpha beta (t bill yield) 
gamma 
(demand deposits 
& other checkable 
deposits) 
gamma 
(demand deposits) 
# 
obs R
Interest 
Rates 
2 
> 4% 
1.278 (18.95) -.080(-10.64)   352 0.176 
-.046 (-1.55) -.021 (-7.09) .0021  (28.81)  352 0.794 
-0.53  (-7.97) -.031 (-6.86)  .0053  (25.73) 352 0.667 
Interest 
Rates 
< 4% 
2.10  (14.89) -.292 (-5.33)   106 0.279 
1.03  (5.07) -.247 (-5.05) .0015  (8.05)  106 0.454 
.464  (1.68) -.240 (-4.92)  .0047   (7.30) 106 0.452 
Interest 
Rates 
> 3% 
1.30  (21.51) -.083 (-11.79)   397 0.187 
-.031 (-1.07) -.020 (-6.33) .0020  (31.03)  397 0.763 
-.507 (-8.09) -.034 (-7.72)  .0053   (27.19) 397 0.660 
Interest 
Rates 
< 3% 
1.99   (10.83) -.213 (-2.56)   61 0.111 
1.98   (4.17) -.214 (-1.91) .00002  (0.03)  61 0.111 
2.25  (2.71) -.205 (-2.04)  -.0008   (-0.28) 61 0.112 
 
 Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by using the Newey-West method. 
 
 In this case beta is the value of interest. Beta for both 3 percent and 4 percent increases in 
absolute terms as interest rates fall. The highest value for beta in absolute terms is -.29 for 
interest rates less than or equal to 4 percent and -.21 for interest rates less than equal to 3 percent.  
The -0.29 value surpasses most previous results but still does not show empirically that there is a 
liquidity trap.  Since Table 10 results looked promising, and to be consistent with much of the 
previous data another series of regressions were run. The data used were the same as in Table 10 
but in log form.  The results are shown below. 
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Table 11 Log Regressions from Jan 1970 - aug 2008 less Dec90, Jan 91, Feb 91, Jan 2000, 
Sep 2001, Aug 2007 for 3% and 4% 
 
ln excess reserves = alpha + beta ln (t-bill yield) + gamma ln (deposits) 
 
alpha 
beta 
ln (t-bill 
yield) 
gamma 
ln (demand 
deposits & other 
checkable 
deposits) 
gamma 
ln (demand              
deposits) 
# 
obs R
Interest 
2 
Rates 
> 4% 
1.080  (4.96) -.900 (-8.43)   352 0.124 
-9.140    (-42.66) -.213 (-4.49) 1.498 (47.97)  352 0.887 
-14.890  (-28.87) -.226 (-2.96)  2.631 (32.60) 352 0.685 
Interest 
Rates 
< 4% 
.667     (9.07) -.611 (-4.96)   106 0.203 
-7.972    (-17.55) -.363 (-5.14) 1.328 (19.39)  106 0.796 
-14.193  (-13.50) -.381 (-5.17)  2.558 (14.21) 106 0.750 
Interest 
Rates 
> 3% 
.931    (5.31) -.828 (-9.33)   397 0.132 
-9.139    (-48.57) -.156 (-3.73) 1.479 (52.53)  397 0.883 
-14.908  (-33.35) -.235 (-3.83)  2.638 (36.33) 397 0.707 
Interest 
Rates 
< 3% 
.542     (8.62) -.191 (-2.07)   61 0.094 
2.825   (1.21) -.160 (-1.53) -.356 (-0.97)  61 0.104 
3.471   (1.19) -.170 (-1.71)  -.508 (-1.00) 61 0.106 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by the Newey-West method. 
 
 Once again, the results do not confirm the existence of a liquidity trap.  While the 
estimates of beta are uniformly negative and typically statistically significant at rigorous levels, 
the absolute value of these estimated interest elasticities are not consistently higher at lower 
interest rates than at higher interest rates.  This is likely due to the fact that there is a threshold at 
some very low interest rate below which bank demand for excess reserves becomes highly elastic 
and we simply do not have enough observations when interest rates were extremely low to 
confirm existence of a banker’s liquidity trap. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Actions Taken by the Federal Reserve to Increase 
Liquidity 
 As detailed in the previous sections, monetary policy becomes ineffective in a “liquidity 
trap” because of abnormal demand by the public and banks for liquidity.  Individuals and 
businesses choose to hold onto money because the opportunity cost of doing so is negligible.  
Likewise, banks hold onto excess reserves because their opportunity costs of holding onto them 
also declines. This supports their acts of hoarding, while abetting the private sector’s desire to 
borrow less.  Can a central bank stimulate economic activity in the presence of a liquidity trap? 
The tools that central banks use to provide liquidity during normal economic periods 
include open market operations and direct credit extension through standing lending facilities.  In 
the United States open market operations have been the primary tool used to manage reserves in 
the banking system, thus controlling nominal short term interest rates, including the federal funds 
rate.  The Federal Reserve’s discount window is the standing lending facility serving as a source 
of reserves when individual banks experience short term funding shortfalls.  Other typical tools 
used in normal times include changing the discount rate and changing the reserve requirement.  
However, during the current financial crisis the Federal Reserve concluded that new ways of 
providing liquidity were necessary.41
In quick succession, between August 2007 and May 2008, the Federal Reserve increased 
the term of discount lending from overnight to 30 days and again later to 90 days; created the 
Term Auction Facility (TAF); created swap lines with European Central Bank and the Swiss 
National Bank; created the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF); approved a loan to Bear 
Stearns through JP Morgan Chase; and created the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF). 
 
Discount Window Lending 
                                                 
41 Ben Bernanke, “Liquidity Provision by the Federal Reserve”, a speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta Financial Conference, Sea Island Georgia, May 29, 2008. 
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The Federal Reserve lends money to depository institutions (commercial banks, thrift 
institutions and U.S. branches of foreign banks) at the discount window.  It has three lending 
programs – primary credit, secondary credit and seasonal credit programs.  These programs are 
available as a backup source of liquidity on a short-term basis. 
The Federal Reserve grants primary credit on a short term basis (normally overnight) to 
depository institutions that are financially strong and well capitalized.  There are no restrictions 
on the use of primary credit. 
The Federal Reserve offers secondary credit to banks that do not qualify for primary 
credit.  Similar to primary credit, secondary credit is available on a short-term basis (normally 
overnight).  Greater administrative requirements characterize secondary from primary credit, so 
that the Federal Reserve can ensure pay back of the loan. 
Seasonal credit is given to small and mid-size banks whose needs fluctuate throughout 
the year.  These banks are normally associated with agricultural communities. 
Discount window loans are secured by collateral that exceeds the amount of the loans.  
The amount of collateral greater than the loan amount is known as a “haircut”.  In order to inject 
liquidity into the financial markets the Federal Reserve, in August 2007, changed the normal 
overnight lending practice for term financing to 30 days and made it renewable at the discretion 
of the borrower.  Then, in March of 2008, in an effort to bolster liquidity, again the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System approved an increase in the maximum maturity of 
primary credit from 30 days to 90 days.  These longer time frame borrowing provisions are still 
in effect as of November 2009, and per the Board of Governors will remain in effect until the 
Federal Reserve determines that market liquidity has significantly improved. 
Term Auction Facility (TAF) 
As described above, the Federal Reserve normally provides reserves through its open 
market operations and discount window.  Banks in turn, lend to one another as well as to the 
general public based on the borrower’s credit worthiness and the banks’ own ability to access 
funds.  During times of financial crisis, banks may scale back their lending, normally referred to 
as “term” lending.  This may be because credit worthiness cannot be ascertained, or the banks’ 
ability to raise funds may be in question which results in hoarding.  Consequently, banks that 
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need funds may not have access to the term funds they desire.  This situation emerged during the 
current financial crisis. 
To resolve this situation, and in an attempt to increase liquidity, the Federal Reserve 
changed the operation of its discount window.  The Federal Reserve decided to auction funds 
directly to banks by creating the Term Auction Facility (TAF).  Through TAF banks can obtain 
funds for a longer period of time, at a market-determined interest rate in a competitive market 
format. 
The auction approach of injecting liquidity into banks has three advantages over the 
traditional discount window and open market operation approach.  First, auctions allow the 
Federal Reserve to control precisely how much, and when, liquidity would be injected into the 
market.  Second, auctions avoid the stigma associated with using the discount window (in normal 
times banks tend to shy away from the discount window for fear of being seen as a troubled).  
Third, auctions allow the Federal Reserve to provide funds directly to a larger number of banks 
rather than the small number of primary dealers associated with open market operations.42  The 
number of primary dealers is normally fluid. The latest list of dealers, which was issued July 27, 
2009, numbered eighteen and hasn’t changed (as of November, 2009).43
Swap Lines 
 
A Swap line is also known as a temporary reciprocal currency arrangement.  This 
arrangement “is a transaction where two parties exchange an agreed amount of two currencies 
while at the same time agreeing to unwind the currency exchange at a future date.”44  Currency 
swaps are used among businesses as well as banks. They were introduced by the World Bank in 
1981 to obtain Swiss francs and German marks by exchanging cash flows with IBM.45
                                                 
42 Olivier Armantier, Sandra Krieger, and James McAndrews, “The Federal Reserve’s Term Auction 
Facility”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Current Issues in Economics and Finance 14, No. 5 (July 2008), 5-6. 
  With 
markets extending around the world, the Federal Reserve has established swap lines with other 
central banks to provide liquidity.  There are two types of swap lines: dollar liquidity lines and 
foreign-currency lines. 
43 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Primary Dealers List” effective July 27, 2009. 
44 Mike Hammil,  “What’s a Swap Line?” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, macroblog, September 18, 
2008. 
45 “Currency Swap”, Encyclopedia Wikipedia, 2009. 
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Dollar Liquidity Swap Lines 
In December of 2007, the Federal Reserve initiated dollar liquidity swap lines with the 
European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank to provide liquidity in U.S. dollars to foreign 
markets. Later, they initiated dollar liquidity swap lines with other central banks. 
“These swaps involve two transactions.  When a foreign central bank 
draws on its swap line with the Federal Reserve, the foreign central bank sells a 
specified amount of its currency to the Federal Reserve in exchange for dollars at 
the prevailing market exchange rate.  The Federal Reserve holds the foreign 
currency in an account at the foreign central bank.  The dollars that the Federal 
Reserve provides are deposited in an account that the foreign central bank 
maintains at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  At the same time, the 
Federal Reserve and the foreign central bank enter into a binding agreement for a 
second transaction that obligates the foreign central bank to buy back its currency 
on a specified future date at the same exchange rate.  The second transaction 
unwinds the first.  At the conclusion of the second transaction, the foreign central 
bank pays interest, at a market-base rate, to the Federal Reserve.”46
Foreign-Currency Liquidity Swap Lines 
 
The purpose of foreign-currency liquidity swap lines is to provide the Federal Reserve 
with the ability to offer liquidity to U.S. institutions in foreign currency.  These lines are similar 
to dollar liquidity swap lines which, as stated above, provide foreign central banks with the 
ability to offer U.S. dollar liquidity to institutions in their respective countries. 
Twenty-eight Day Repurchase Agreements 
Repurchase agreements (repos) are the most common type of secured funding 
transaction.  They are a sale of securities, coupled with an agreement to repurchase the same 
securities on a later date, but typically at a higher price.  Repos are a tool of monetary policy 
through which the Federal Reserve can add or subtract bank reserves in order to influence short-
term rates.  The Federal Reserve uses repurchase agreements to make collateralized loans to 
primary dealers (institutions with a trading relationship with the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York and not necessarily a depository institution).  This action offsets temporary fluctuations in 
bank reserves.  Repos are conducted by auction where primary dealers bid on borrowing the 
money.  They are the most common form of temporary open market operation and normally can 
                                                 
46 “Central Bank Liquidity Swaps”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Credit and Liquidity 
Programs and the Balance Sheet, 2009. 
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be bought and sold for terms from one to 65 business days, but rarely no longer than 14 days.47
Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) 
  
As a result of the financial crisis, in March 2008, the Federal Reserve announced the intention to 
conduct 28-day repos cumulating to an amount of $100 billion.  This doubling of the normal 
time, by which primary dealers were lent money and by which the amount of bank reserves 
could be temporarily altered, was implemented to increase liquidity in the banking system. 
The Federal Reserve announced the creation of the Term Securities Lending Facility 
(TSLF) in March 2008 to promote funding liquidity.  The TSLF was established on a temporary 
basis under the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending powers.  TSLF is intended to ease liquidity 
pressures in the secured, or collateralized, funding markets relied on by primary dealers.  The 
facility increases the ability of primary dealers to obtain cash in the private market, by enabling 
the dealers to pledge securities temporarily as collateral for Treasuries.  It works as an auction.  
Dealers bid to borrow over time, up to $200 billion in Treasury securities from the Federal 
Reserve, for a term of twenty-eight days, with the dealers agreeing to provide other securities as 
collateral.  As a result, the TSLF reduces the need for primary dealers to sell assets when markets 
are illiquid.48
Bear Stearns and JP Morgan Chase 
 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, on March 14, 2008, announced that 
“The Federal Reserve is monitoring market developments closely and will continue to provide 
liquidity as necessary to promote the orderly functioning of the financial system.  The Board 
voted unanimously to approve the arrangement announced by JP Morgan Chase and Bear 
Stearns this morning.”49
                                                 
47 “Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Transactions” FEDPOINT, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
August, 2007. 
  The announced arrangement was that, JP Morgan Chase would provide 
an unspecified amount of funding to Bear Stearns, for an initial period of 28 days, and those 
loans would be effectively insured by the Federal Reserve.  This insurance by the Federal 
48 Michael J. Fleming, Warren B. Hrung, and Frank M. Keane, “The Term Securities Lending Facility: 
Origin, Design and Effects”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Current Issues in Economics and Finance  15,  No. 
2, (February, 2009), 1-2. 
49 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Press Release” regarding JP Morgan Chase and 
Bear Stearns, March 14, 2008. 
 67 
Reserve was again use of its emergency lending powers to inject liquidity into the markets, 
beyond day-to-day operations. 
 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) 
On March 17, 2008, in response to the ongoing financial crisis, including the collapse of 
Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve announced the creation of another new lending facility, the 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).  PDCF is an overnight facility that provides funding to 
primary dealers in exchange for a specified range of eligible collateral.  It was intended to 
improve the ability of dealers to access liquidity. 
PDCF is closely related to TSLF.  Both are open to primary dealers as opposed to 
depository institutions, meaning non-bank institutions such as investment banks outside the 
regulation of the Federal Reserve. “A key difference between PDCF and TSLF is that PDCF is a 
standing facility whereas TSLF is an auction facility.  As a standing facility, the PDCF offers the 
advantage of availability on a continuous, as needed basis.  It also accepts a broader class of 
securities as collateral.”50
Additional Actions 
 
Subsequent to the actions just described, the Federal Reserve took additional steps by 
creating the following supplementary lending facilities to provide liquidity to other sectors of the 
financial markets: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility; Commercial Paper Funding Facility; Money Market Investor Funding Facility; and a 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility.  In addition, the Fed began paying interest on bank 
required and excess reserves. 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility (AMLF) 
In order to enhance its attempts to provide liquidity to the markets, the Federal Reserve 
announced in September 2008 that it was creating the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
                                                 
50 Michael J. Fleming, Warren B. Hrung, and Frank M. Keane, p. 4. 
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Market Mutual Fund Facility (AMLF).  This temporary lending facility provides funding, to U.S. 
depository institutions and bank holding companies, to finance their purchases of high-quality 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from money market mutual funds.  The facility is 
intended to assist money market funds, which hold such paper, in meeting demands for 
redemptions by investors and to foster liquidity in the ABCP market and money markets in 
general. 
Commercial Paper Lending Facility (CPFF) 
The Federal Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to provide a 
liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper.  The CPFF is intended to improve 
liquidity in short-term funding markets and thereby increase availability of credit to businesses 
and households.  Under the CPFF, the Federal Reserve will finance the purchase of highly rated 
unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper via primary dealers.  It finances only highly rated, 
U.S. dollar-denominated three-month commercial paper. 
Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
The Federal Reserve created the temporary Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
(MMIFF) in October, 2008 to support a private-sector initiative to provide liquidity to U.S. 
money market investors. 
In the fall of 2008, short-term debt markets were under considerable strain as money 
market funds and other investors had difficulty selling assets to satisfy redemption requests.  The 
MMIFF was intended to facilitate the sales of money market instruments in the secondary 
market, thereby increasing the liquidity position of money market investors.  The Federal 
Reserve thought that this would help money market funds meet investor redemption requests and 
encourage investors to continue investing in money market instruments. This would enhance the 
banks’ ability to meet business and household credit requirements.  This was accomplished by 
the Federal Reserve providing secured funding to finance U.S. dollar-denominated certificates of 
deposits and dollar denominated three-month commercial paper by money market mutual funds. 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) 
In November, 2008 the Federal Reserve created the Term Asset Backed Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF).  This funding facility was initially intended to help market participants meet the 
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credit needs of households and small businesses.  It was to help by supporting the issuance of 
asset-backed securities (ABS) collateralized by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and 
loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA). 
The Federal Reserve started this program because in September of 2008 the issuance of 
ABS declined severely and then stopped completely in October of 2008.  This created a severe 
liquidity crunch because ABS markets support the substantial share of consumer credit and SBA-
guaranteed small business loans.  Consequently, trouble in these markets would have 
significantly limited the availability of credit to households and small businesses and in turn 
further weakened the U.S. economy.  This program works by the Federal Reserve lending money 
to the holders of AAA-rated ABS backed by consumer and small business loans. 
Initially the Federal Reserve limited the amount of money lent in support of TALF to 
$200 billion.  However, in February 2009, the Federal Reserve announced that they were 
prepared to undertake a substantial expansion of the TALF program.  The expansion has the 
potential of increasing the size of TALF to $1 trillion while also expanding the types of AAA-
rated asset backed securities supported by the program, mainly commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS). 
In May 2009, the Federal Reserve, did in fact, announce that CMBS and securities 
backed by insurance premium finance loans would be eligible for TALF funding. CMBS was 
added to the TALF program because the CMBS market came to a halt in mid-2008.  CMBS 
accounted for almost half of new commercial mortgage originations in 2007.  The Federal 
Reserve believed that this action would prevent defaults on economically viable commercial 
properties and facilitate the sale of distressed properties.  It also anticipated that this action will 
help borrowers finance new purchases of commercial properties and the refinancing of existing 
mortgages. 
Insurance premium ABS was included in TALF to facilitate the flow of credit to small 
businesses.  Over 1.5 million insurance premium loans are extended to small businesses each 
year to enable them to obtain property and casualty insurance.  These loans are often funded by 
ABS, but have been hard to obtain with the disruption in the ABS market. 
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Interest Paid on Required Balances and Excess Balances 
The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 originally authorized the Federal 
Reserve to begin paying interest on balances held by, or on behalf of, depository institutions 
beginning October 1, 2011.  The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 accelerated the 
effective date to October 1, 2008.  The Federal Reserve believes that paying interest on required 
reserve balances will eliminate the opportunity cost of holding required reserves, thereby 
promoting efficiency in the banking sector.51  The Federal Reserve uses different formulas to 
determine the interest rate paid to depository institutions on required reserve balances and excess 
balances.  The formulas have been altered twice since their inception.  The Federal Reserve 
altered the formulas to foster trading in the funds market at rates close to the Federal Open 
Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) targeted federal funds rate.52
 
  This feature effectively puts a 
floor under the federal funds rate, to ensure that the Federal Reserve can hit its targeted federal 
funds rate.  For example, if the Federal Reserve is paying 0.50 percent on excess reserves, banks 
will not lend in the federal funds market at less than 0.50 percent. 
Special Liquidity Injections Summary 
The following table summarizes specific aspects of the initiated programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release regarding Interest on Reserves, 
October 6, 2008. 
52 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release regarding Interest on Reserves, 
November 5, 2008. 
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Table 12 Special Liquidity Injections Summary 
 Announcement 
Date 
Applies to Pre-Crisis 
Maturity 
Crisis  
Maturity 
Termination 
Date 
w/changes 
Current 
Term Date 
Discount 
Lending 
August 17, 2007 
 
Depository 
Institutions 
Overnight 
– 14 days 
30-90 days   
TAF Dec 12, 2007 Depository 
Institutions 
N/A 28 days 
84 days 
For as long 
as 
necessary 
For as long 
as 
necessary 
Swap Lines Dec 12, 2007 Central 
Banks 
  30 April 2009 
30 Oct 2009 
1 Feb 2010 
Repurchase 
Agreements 
March 2008 Primary 
Dealers 
Typical 0 
to 14 days 
Typical 28 
days 
  
TSLF March 11, 2008 Primary 
Dealers 
N/A 28 days 30 Jan2009 
30 April 2009 
30 Oct 2009 
1 Feb 2010 
PDLF March 16, 2008 Primary 
Dealers 
N/A Continuous 
as needed 
30 Jan 2009 
30 April 2009 
30 Oct 2009 
1 Feb 2010 
AMLF Sept 19, 2008 Depository 
Institutions & 
Bank Holding 
Companies 
N/A  30 Jan 2009 
30 April 2009 
30 Oct 2009 
1 Feb 2010 
Interest Rates 
Payable on 
Reserves 
Oct 1, 2008 Depository 
Institutions 
N/A    
CPFF Oct, 14, 2008 Commercial 
Paper Issuers 
N/A  30 April 2009 
30 Oct 2009 
1 Feb 2010 
MMIFF Oct 21, 2008 Money 
Market 
Mutual Funds 
& Investors 
N/A  30 April 2009 
30 Oct 2009 
Expired  
30 Oct 2009  
TALF November 25, 
2008 
 
 
May 1, 2009 
 
ABS 
 
 
 
CMBS 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
 31 Dec 2009 
31 Dec 2009 
 
 
31 Dec 2009 
 
31Mar2010 
 
 
 
30 Jun 2010 
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CHAPTER 4 - Have the Special Liquidity Injections Worked? 
Whether these additional liquidity tools have worked is a matter of dispute.  The Federal 
Reserve in 2009 reported that conditions in financial markets had improved in recent months. 
While at nearly the same time, others have commented that “just about every policy move to 
right the U.S. economy has been a bust.”53
Indicators of Failure 
  So let’s look at the results in terms of successes and 
failures. Failure would be defined as more programs needed to provide more liquidity, individual 
programs dollar amount increased, scope of program increased, borrowing time increased or 
termination dates extended to improve liquidity.  The definition of failure evolves around the 
idea that the initial program was insufficient to resolve the liquidity problem and thus the 
program needed to expand in one form or another.  It is noted that this definition is not ideal. A 
program may be extended because it was found to work and may be incorporated into the routine 
procedures of the Federal Reserve as may be the case for Term Auction Facility (TAF).   Success 
is defined in just the opposite fashion.  A decline in the program would indicate that the program 
worked because the liquidity injections were no longer needed or the need had been reduced. 
Liquidity Program Extensions 
It is quite apparent from Table 8, Special Liquidity Injections Summary, that a majority 
of the programs have been extended, many several times, past their initial termination date.  As 
of November, 2009 the last extension announced by the Federal Reserve was on August 17, 
2009. It was regarding TALF.  The Federal Reserve commented that the markets for asset-
backed securities (ABS) backed by consumer and business loans and for commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) were still impaired and it seemed likely that they would remain so for 
some time. Consequently, ABS was extended through March 31, 2010 and CMBS was extended 
through June 30, 2010, from their previously authorized date of December 31, 2009. This is an 
indication that the programs have not had the impact on the liquidity as initially thought, but may 
be useful and just need more time to produce results. 
                                                 
53 Andy Kessler, “The Bernanke Market”, The Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2009 p. A15, cols 1-4. 
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Liquidity Program Scope 
Since the crisis began there have been four major timeframes in which the Federal 
Reserve initiated liquidity programs, the fall of 2007, the spring of 2008, the fall of 2008 and the 
spring of 2009.  Additionally in the fall of 2009 the Federal Reserve expanded the size and scope 
of the TALF program.  It can be surmised that, as one set of programs failed to end the liquidity 
crunch, another set of programs was added to the growing list. 
Liquidity Program Targets 
The liquidity programs initially started by the Federal Reserve targeted the institutions 
normally under the Federal Reserve’s purview, the depository institutions.  As these actions 
failed to resolve the liquidity crisis, the Federal Reserve, using its emergency powers, targeted 
other financial institutions not typically under its control, the primary dealers.  As this action 
failed to curtail the crisis, the Federal Reserve used its emergency powers again and targeted 
other financial institutions including, but not limited to, money market funds, issuers of 
commercial paper and those associated with asset backed securities. 
Liquidity Program’s Size 
The dollar amount authorized in support of the TALF program increased from $200 
billion to $1 trillion as the scope of the program increased. 
Borrowing Time 
Duration of programs has been lengthened.  Discount lending went from the typical 
overnight-14 days to overnight-30 days and then even to 90 days for primary credit.  TAF started 
with a 28 day auction, but was expanded with the addition of an 84 day auction.  Repurchase 
agreements went from the typical overnight-14 days to overnight-28 days. 
Swap Lines 
Swap line arrangements were initially with the European Central Bank and the Swiss 
National Bank, but have expanded to include eleven other central banks.  These are: the Reserve 
Bank of Australia, the Banco Cetral do Brasil, the Bank of Canada, Danmarks National Bank, 
the Bank of England, the Bank of Korea, the Banco de Mexico, the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, Norges Bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Sveriges Riksbank. 
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Indicators of Success: 
As of June 25, 2009, the Federal Reserve reported that conditions in the wholesale 
funding markets had improved in recent weeks to a point that changes could be made to several 
of its liquidity programs.54
TAF Auctions 
 
The amount bid at TAF auctions was below the amount offered for several auctions.  
With the decreased need for TAF funding, the Federal Reserve reduced the amounts being 
offered from $150 billion to $125 billion in the biweekly auctions. In July 2009, the Federal 
Reserve again reduced the amount being offered to $100 billion. In August, they announced that 
the September auctions will be reduced to $75 billion for both the 84 day and 28 day auctions. 
Late September, the Federal Reserve announced that it will continue to offer $75 billion for its 
28 day auctions through January 2010.  However, it was going to lower its 84 day auction to $50 
billion in October and to $25 billion in November and December.  The Federal Reserve also 
announced at the same time that it will be assessing whether to maintain TAF on a permanent 
basis. 
TSLF Auctions 
The Federal Reserve reported that, since primary dealers had made considerable progress 
in deleveraging and since access to funding for repurchase agreements had improved borrowing 
at the TSLF had fallen markedly.  As a result, the Federal Reserve suspended TSLF auctions 
backed by Schedule 1 collateral (Treasury, agency debt, and agency-guaranteed mortgage-
backed securities).  TSLF auctions backed by Schedule 2 collateral (Schedule 1 and investment-
grade corporate, municipal, mortgage-backed, and asset backed securities) will be conducted 
every 4 weeks rather than every 2 weeks.  Additionally, the total amount offered under TSLF is 
reduced to $75 billion from $200 billion. 
MMIF 
The Federal Reserve determined that there was no need to extend the MMIF program, so 
its authorization expired 30 October 2009. 
                                                 
54 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release regarding extensions and  
modifications to its liquidity programs, 25 June, 2009. 
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AMLF 
The Federal Reserve reported that usage of the AMLF had declined considerably.  
However, the Federal Reserve considered the markets still fragile and thus extended the 
authorization of AMLF until 1 February, 2010. 
 
Indeed, there have been some improvements in liquidity, as indicated by the Federal 
Reserve, and everything has not been a bust, as seen through the eyes of others.  But, I would 
fathom to say that the Federal Reserve has a long way to go to improve overall liquidity in the 
economy.  Particularly, since the latest data in FRED, dated 21 October, 2009 shows total 
commercial and industrial loans still declining. In its November 4, 2009 press release, the FOMC 
stated that, although household spending appeared to be expanding, it remained constrained due 
tight credit among other things. Likewise, business was still cutting back on investment and the 
FOMC expected economic activity to remain weak for a time. Consequently, despite the special 
liquidity injections by the Federal Reserve, the economy is most likely still in a “liquidity trap”, 
with interest rates near zero and the ability of monetary policy to boost economic activity 
questionable.  Even so, the Federal Reserve does believe that its monetary stimulus in 
conjunction with fiscal stimulus will support a strengthening of economic growth over time.55
                                                 
55 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release of 4 November 2009. 
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CHAPTER 5 - Conducting Monetary Policy at Low Interest Rates 
It was just presented that the country, in the fall of 2009, most likely remains in a 
“liquidity trap”.  With interest rates near zero and monetary policy possibly not very effective, is 
there anything further, the Federal Reserve can do to stimulate the economy?  In 2004, before he 
became Federal Reserve Chairman and years before this financial crisis, Ben Bernanke espoused  
three monetary strategies that the Federal Reserve could follow to improve an economy that was 
not responding to a near zero interest rate policy. The strategies were: influence financial 
investors’ expectations about future interest rates; change the composition of the Federal Reserve 
balance sheet; and increase the size of the Federal Reserve Balance sheet.56
Influencing Expected Future Interest Rates 
  
The role of expectations evolves around convincing financial investors that short term 
interest rates will be lower in the future than they currently expect.  This relates to the term 
structure of interest rates, which is the relationship between long term and short term interest 
rates at a given point in time.  Long-term interest rates are determined by the current short term 
interest rate and expected future short term interest rates. Therefore, it is believed that the 
Federal Reserve can indirectly influence long term interest rates by directly controlling short 
term interest rates and influencing the expectations of future short term interest rates.  Since long 
term interest rates sway consumption and investment decisions (low interest rates spur 
consumers to purchase durable goods, automobiles and houses), the Federal Reserve could 
increase aggregate spending and thus stimulate the economy by convincing the public that short 
term interest rates will remain low for a significant period of time.  There is significant lack of 
consensus among economists about the ability of a central bank to do this. 
 
                                                 
56 Ben S. Bernanke and Vincent R. Reinhart, “Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term 
Interest Rates” Paper presented at the International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies Lecture, Geneva 
Switzerland, January 14, 2004. p.1. 
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Balance Sheet Composition 
The Federal Reserve holds a variety of assets, which include: gold certificate accounts, 
Special Drawing Rights accounts, coins, loans to depository institutions, U. S. Treasury 
securities, cash items in process of collection and assets denominated in foreign currency and 
other assets. Each one of these different assets presents the possibility to shape monetary policy.  
For example, the Federal Reserve can buy any of the different types of “used” U.S. Treasury 
bonds with various maturities (four weeks to thirty years) that are offered in the secondary 
market.  The Federal Reserve could influence term premiums, and thus overall yields, by shifting 
the composition of its holdings from shorter to longer dated securities.57
Balance Sheet Size 
 
The Federal Reserve can also influence monetary policy by changing the size of its 
balance sheet. It can change the size of its balance sheet by buying and selling securities, which 
in turn, alters the amount of reserves and the money supply. Increasing the amount of reserves 
beyond what is needed to keep interest rates near zero is known as “quantitative easing”.  
Quantitative easing impacts the economy in various ways or channels. One channel is, if it is 
assumed that money is not a perfect substitute for other financial assets, the increase in the 
money supply will cause investors to rebalance their investment portfolios, raising prices and 
reducing yields on non-money assets. Lower yields on long-term assets will in turn stimulate the 
economy.58
Federal Reserve Monetary Policy 
 
Did Ben Bernanke follow his own advice?  With respect to influencing expectations 
regarding interest rates the answer is a resounding, “Yes”.  As pointed out earlier, and reiterated 
in several FOMC statements, including its most recent one of November 4, 2009, the Committee 
stated that it will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and 
continues to anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of 
the federal funds rate for an extended period. With respect to the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet, composition of it has changed dramatically. Prior to the financial crisis the largest asset 
                                                 
57 Ibid. p. 3. 
58 Ibid. p. 5. 
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holding by the Federal Reserve was U.S. Treasury securities, accounting for nearly seven-eights 
of total assets.  As of April of 2009, U.S. Treasury securities totaled $780 billion, or about three-
eights of Federal Reserve assets. Accordingly, other assets have expanded drastically.59  Federal 
Reserve assets now fall into three broad categories.  Ben Bernanke described these categories as: 
(1) short-term credit extended to support the liquidity of financial firms, such as depository 
institutions, broker-dealers, and money market mutual funds; (2) assets related to programs 
focused on broader credit conditions; and (3) holdings of high-quality securities, notably 
Treasury securities, agency debt, and agency-backed mortgage-backed securities (MBS).60
The short-term liquidity provided to financial institutions, as of August 2009, totaled 
almost $860 billion and represented nearly 45 percent of the assets on the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet.
 
61
The second category of the Federal Reserve balance sheet, which includes direct lending 
to borrowers and investors, totaled nearly $255 billion or roughly 13 percent of the assets on the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet as of August 2009.  These assets also encompassed the newly 
instituted liquidity programs detailed in Chapter 3, mainly the CPFF and TALF. 
 This short-term liquidity encompasses many of the newly instituted liquidity 
programs detailed in Chapter 3, such as the TAF, PDCF, and TSLF. 
The third category of assets consisting of high-quality securities, which was already 
mentioned to be in the amount of $780 billion, is made up of $490 billion in U.S. Treasury 
Securities and $290 in agency debt, as of August, 2009. 
Accompanying the change in composition of the balance sheet has been the size of the 
balance. The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet has “more than doubled, from roughly $870 billion 
before the crisis to roughly $2 trillion now (April 2009).” 62
                                                 
59 Ben S. Bernanke, “The Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet”, Speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond 2009 Credit Markets Symposium, Charlotte, North Carolina, April 3, 2009, p. 2. 
  The size of the balance is expected 
to grow larger. The FOMC announced March 18, 2009, that it was going to purchase an 
additional $750 billion of agency MBS, bringing its total purchase of these securities to up to 
$1.25 trillion this year. Additionally, it was going to increase its purchase of agency debt this 
year up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion.  The committee also made the 
60 Agency debt, in this instance, is debt issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan 
Banks.  Agency MBS are backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. 
61 Ben S. Bernanke, “The Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet”, Speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond 2009 Credit Markets Symposium, Charlotte, North Carolina, April 3, 2009, p. 2. 
62 Ibid., p. 2. 
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commitment to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the following 
six months. On November 4, 2009, because of the availability of agency debt, the FOMC 
announced that it was reducing the amount of agency debt it was buying from $200 billion to 
$175 billion. It was also going to slow the pace of agency debt purchases to promote a smooth 
transition in markets, but that the transactions would be completed by the first quarter of 2010. 
As of October 28, 2009 the Federal Reserve Total Assets, as reported in FRED, were $2.16 
trillion. 
Results 
In April 2009, Ben Bernanke stated that 30-year fixed mortgage rates, which responded 
very little to the Federal Reserve cuts to the targeted federal funds rate, declined 1 to 1.5 
percentage points since the Federal Reserve began purchasing agency mortgage backed 
securities in November 2008. The November 4, 2009 Wall Street Journal reported 30 year fixed 
mortgage rate as 5.29% with a 52-week range from a low of 5.06% and high of 6.50% with a 3 
year percentage change of -.59 percent.  It does appear that long term interest rates have come 
down slightly over the past year and are lower now by a little over 1 percentage point from their 
highs for the year. This decline in long term interest rates, may have contributed to the positive 
third quarter GDP numbers reported by the Commerce department’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis report of October 29, 2009. However, in its November 4, 2009 statement, the FOMC 
still believes that economic activity will remain weak for some time and constrained by ongoing 
job losses. This statement by the FOMC is insightful in light of the fact that the unemployment 
rate increased to 10.2%, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of 
Labor, November 6, 2009 jobs report.  This is the highest level of unemployment in twenty-six 
years. Subsequently, the December 4, 2009 jobs report stated that only 11,000 additional jobs 
had been lost in November, and that unemployment rate changed to 10 percent. 
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CHAPTER 6 - The Role of Inflationary Expectations 
As previously stated, in the modern view of a “liquidity trap”, monetary policy would 
still be effective when current nominal interest rates are zero. This is because monetary policies 
would work through future expected inflation and thus future interest rates. Accordingly, the 
only way out of a “liquidity trap” would be to raise inflationary expectations.  This is possible, 
per Paul Krugman, by the government increasing deficit spending with fiscal policy or with 
“irresponsible monetary policy”. In other words, convince the public that monetary expansion is 
not merely temporary and that the central bank will not reverse its policy of monetary expansion 
when prices begin to rise. 
Irresponsible Monetary Policy? 
Let’s review current monetary policy to determine whether it is irresponsible. Has the 
Federal Reserve tried to convince the public that it will not reverse monetary expansion when 
prices begin to rise? 
It was shown in Chapter 5 that current monetary policy is one of expansion.  This has not 
changed according to several press releases by the Federal Open Market Committee. The 
committee has stated that it will maintain the federal funds target range between 0 and ¼ percent 
for a considerable period of time.  The FOMC also has stated that it “will employ all available 
tools to promote economic recovery and preserve price stability.”63  This policy was reiterated 
by the FOMC at the conclusion of its meetings on August 12, September 23, and the latest 
meeting of November 4, 2009. However, both the September 23 and November 4 press releases 
included the comment that the committee “continues to anticipate that economic conditions are 
likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period.”64
                                                 
63 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release following the Federal Open Market 
Committee meeting of 23-24 June, 2009. 
  
The statement regarding preserving price stability implies that the Federal Reserve will not 
continue monetary expansion once prices begin to rise more rapidly in an economic recovery.  It 
64 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release following the Federal Open Market 
Committee meeting of  3-4 November, 2009. 
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was also shown in Chapter 5 that the Federal Reserve’s strategy to conduct monetary policy in a 
zero interest rate environment is to  (1) increase liquidity to financial firms, such as depository 
institutions, broker-dealers, and money market mutual funds with new, innovative but short lived 
credit programs; (2) alter the composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet in order to 
impact monetary policy positively; and (3) increase the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet by purchasing high-quality securities, notably Treasury securities, agency debt, and 
agency-backed mortgage-backed securities (MBS).  In other words, the Federal Reserve is not 
conducting “irresponsible monetary policy” in order to influence inflation expectations, as 
suggested by Paul Krugman.  
Fiscal Policy 
The other alternative for manipulating people’s expectation regarding future inflation and 
interest rates is fiscal policy.  Fiscal policy is directed at government spending and taxation.  
Government spending by itself wouldn’t increase the public’s expectations regarding inflation, 
but deficit spending by the government would.65
Deficit spending is defined as the difference between government expenditures and tax 
revenues.  There are three ways to finance government deficits with each resulting in a differing 
degree of inflation: borrow money from the central bank; borrow money from the public; and 
raising taxes. Borrowing money from the central bank means that the Federal Reserve will 
increase the money supply to pay for the government spending.  This is the equivalent of printing 
money and is highly inflationary. For that reason it is generally not done by industrialized 
nations. Borrowing money from the public is accomplished by the government selling bonds to 
the public. This borrowing allows for increased spending, which shifts the aggregate demand 
curve rightward, resulting in an increase in prices and thus inflation.  There is no increase in the 
money supply, but there is an increase in the velocity of money through the equation of exchange 
and the demand for loanable funds increases, resulting in higher interest rates.  This approach of 
financing government expenditures is not nearly as inflationary as the printing of money.  The 
least inflationary method to pay for government spending is to raise taxes. Raising taxes reduces 
aggregate expenditures indirectly through consumption spending. Therefore, it is typically not an 
 
                                                 
65 Gauti B. Eggertsson, “Great Expectations and the End of the Depression”, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York staff report no. 234, December 2005. 
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appropriate way to pay for spending in weak economic times when the goal is to boost aggregate 
demand. Therefore, the most effective way of affecting inflation expectations through fiscal 
policy is for the government to issue debt and have the central bank monetize it. 
Expectations and Japan’s Liquidity Trap 
Data from Japan’s recent experience with a “liquidity trap” should provide evidence on 
whether raising inflation expectations are the way out of a “liquidity trap”.  Prior to the United 
States’ current financial crisis, Japan experienced years of deflation, near zero interest rates, 
budget deficits, low output and expanding liquidity, as shown in Figures 39-44. 
 
Figure 39 Japan’s Inflation Rate 
 
From January of 2000 until October of 2004, Japan’s inflation rate was negative. During 
2004 and 2005, the inflation rate was positive for only 4 of the 24 months.  Japan’s inflation rate 
became positive in May 2006 and remained positive through December 2006. In 2007, the 
inflation rate was mostly 0 percent or negative until October. It remained positive for the rest of 
2007 and through 2008. Then, starting in February 2009, Japan’s inflation rate became negative 
and has remained that way with a year-over-year decline of 0.1 percent, as recorded in April of 
2009.  It increased to a decline of 1.1percent in May, followed by declines of 1.8 percent and 2.3 
percent in June and July, respectfully while recording a year-over-year decline of 2.2 percent for 
the most recent time frame that data were available, October 2009. This is shown above and 
reiterated more clearly, in the figure below. 
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Figure 40 Japan's Recent Inflation Rate 
 
 
Figure 41 Japan’s Interest Rate 
 
 
In Japan, decisions on interest rates are made by the Bank of Japan's Policy Board in its 
Monetary Policy Meetings. The Bank of Japan's official interest rate is the discount rate. Since 
March of 2006, Japan’s interest rate has been between 0 and 0.5 percent. The interest rate has 
been 0.1 percent from January 2009 through October 2009. 
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Figure 42 Japan Government Budget 
 
Government budgets are an itemized accounting of the payments received by government 
(taxes and other fees) and the payments made by government (purchases and transfer payments).  
A budget deficit occurs when the government spends more money than it takes in.  As seen 
above, the government of Japan has been running a budget deficit for the entire decade. Six of 
the seven deficits from 2000 through 2006 exceeded six percent of real GDP. 
 
Figure 43 Japan Real GDP Growth Rate 
 
Japan’s real GDP growth rate has been very anemic in the last decade. The growth rate 
started to decline in 2000 and continued declining for almost 2 years before it started to rise in 
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2002.  It rose for almost 2 years before it started to decline again in 2004. For the next 3 years it 
rose and fell until it started a continuous decline in 2007 which continues today in 2009.  The 
following graph shows a more detailed performance over the last three and a half years. 
 
Figure 44 Japan's Recent Real Growth Rate 
 
 
The following table shows the quarterly and yearly average real growth rate of Japan’s 
GDP from March 2000 through June 2009. 
 
Table 13 Japan Real GDP Growth Rate 
 
Year Mar Jun Sep Dec Average 
2009 -8.70 -7.20   -7.95 
2008 1.30 0.60 -0.30 -4.30 -0.68 
2007 3.40 2.20 1.90 1.90 2.35 
2006 2.50 2.00 1.60 2.00 2.03 
2005 1.10 2.00 2.00 2.60 1.93 
2004 4.20 3.20 2.90 0.80 2.78 
2003 1.30 1.30 1.10 1.90 1.40 
2002 -1.90 -0.20 1.50 1.70 0.28 
2001 2.00 1.00 -0.30 -1.80 0.23 
2000 3.30 2.50 3.00 2.60 2.85 
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The following graph shows the money growth rates for the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), United States, United Kingdom and Japan for comparable monetary aggregates year 
over year. Concentrating on Japan’s monetary aggregate, it can be seen that Japan’s money 
supply has not expanded as much as the other countries over the past decade. It hit its low point 
in 2006 and has since been in a very gradual accelerating trend.66
 
 
Figure 45 Selected World Domestic Money Aggregates 
 
 
Japan experienced a classical “liquidity trap”, with interest rates near or at zero and 
increasing money supply apparently having no significant effect on increasing prices or output.  
When near-zero interest rates had no effect, the Bank of Japan adopted a policy of “quantitative 
easing” by increasing the monetary base to the point that it nearly doubled in size since 2001.  
With monetary policy being ineffective, the Japanese policymakers attempted to increase 
demand by higher government spending. The Ministry of Finance ran up large budget deficits to 
                                                 
66 Robert Brusca, “Tight Money Isn’t Funny: EMU Money Growth Continues to Decelerate” July 27, 2009. 
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the point that the ratio of gross debt to GDP reached 140 percent of GDP in 2003.67
 
  This, along 
with a comparison to other countries, is shown in Figure 46 below. 
Figure 46  Gross Debt to GDP, Japan and Other Nations 
 
 
Despite these policy actions, including near-zero interest rates and deficit spending, the 
Japanese GDP barely moved and showed an increase above 1 percent only for a short period in 
2008.  Likewise, prices remained deflated except for a short period in 2008, as shown previously 
by the annual change in the CPI in the Japanese Inflation Rate in Figures 39 and 40.  Deficit 
spending apparently did not work as expected.  Deficit spending by Japanese policy makers did 
not shift the aggregate demand curve outward and thus did not boost output, prices and expected 
inflation.  Why? 
Using the modern definition of a “liquidity trap”, where monetary policy would work 
through future expected inflation, one goal of deficit spending was to convince the private sector 
that there would be inflation in the future.  It would therefore reduce ex ante real interest rates 
                                                 
67 Gauti B. Eggertsson, “Great Expectations and the End of the Depression”, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York staff report no. 234, December 2005, p. 32. 
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and encourage people to spend their money now before prices went up and their purchasing 
power declined.  This, in turn, would shift the aggregate demand curve outward, increase output 
and prices and finally break Japan loose from the liquidity trap.  But this did not happen.  The 
reason, according to Eggertsson, was that Japanese policy makers’ actions were not credible and 
therefore inflation expectations never rose.  With low inflation expectations, real interest rates 
remained relatively high.  The Fisher hypothesis, characterized by the equation eri π+=  (where 
i is the nominal interest rate, r is the real interest rate and πe
eir π−=
 is the expected rate of inflation), 
indicates that nominal interest rates vary directly with the magnitude of expected inflation.  
Rearranging this equation algebraically,  , shows that real interest rate = nominal 
interest rate – expected inflation. Therefore, when expected inflation is negative, i.e. deflation is 
expected, real interest rates are higher than nominal interest rates. In this case the central bank 
may be powerless. 
According to Eggertsson, deficit spending by Japanese policy makers failed to increase 
inflation expectations because “policy actions… have not been taken in the context of a clear 
commitment to inflate the price level … the BoJ (Bank of Japan) has been very reluctant to 
announce any goals for the price level or inflation.”68  Eggertsson’s viewpoint is similar to that 
of Krugman, who states “In a liquidity trap the problem is that markets believe that the central 
bank will target price stability, given the chance – and hence that any current monetary 
expansion is merely transitory.  The traditional view that monetary policy is ineffective in a 
“liquidity trap”, and that fiscal expansion is the only way out, must therefore be qualified: 
monetary policy will be effective after all if the central bank can credibly be irresponsible, to 
seek a higher future price level.”69
The Japanese experience with the “liquidity trap” is insightful. It reinforces the modern 
view of a “liquidity trap”, where aggregate demand depends on both current and expected future 
real interest rates, as previously shown by the following equation 
  The Japanese policy makers did not do this.  Nor is the 
Federal Reserve trying to boost inflation expectations. 
)( 11
e
ttttttt rEiYEY −−−= ++ πσ  
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
69 Paul Krugman, “It’s baaack! Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap.  Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 1998 (2), 137-187. 
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with the caveat that policy must shape peoples expectations about future inflation in order to be 
effective. 
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CHAPTER 7 - Have U.S. Policy Actions Been Effective? 
The case has already been made, that the United States is most likely in a “liquidity trap”, 
using the traditional definition that interest rates are near or at zero and monetary policy is 
ineffective.  What about the modern view where monetary policy can work through altering 
inflation expectations?  The case has been made that the Federal Reserve is not conducting 
“irresponsible monetary policy” and is not trying to manipulate the public’s expectations 
regarding future inflation. However, the Federal Reserve is conducting monetary policy that is 
attempting to increase liquidity and influence the public’s expectations regarding low interest 
rates (both short term and long term) in order to stimulate the economy. It is doing this, along 
with changing both the composition and size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. Inflation 
expectations, on the other hand, can also be influenced by fiscal policy. Consequently, U.S. fiscal 
policy needs to be reviewed to determine if fiscal policy makers are trying to shape peoples 
expectations about future inflation.  
 Previously it was stated that deficit spending is one means of accomplishing this feat, as 
long as the action is credible. In February 2008, as signs of economic slowdown emerged, 
Congress passed a $168 billion package of tax cuts and tax rebates.  As the economy continued 
to contract, another $789 billion stimulus package incorporated in the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act was signed into law by President Obama in February, 2009.  The New York 
Times reported this as “the most expansive unleashing of the government’s fiscal firepower in 
the face of a recession since World War II.”  This stimulus package of “targeted investments and 
tax cuts is designed to get Americans back to work and to get the economy growing again”, 
according to Treasury Secretary Tim Geither.  The stimulus package included federal tax cuts, 
expansion of unemployment benefits, and additional spending on education, health care, energy 
and infrastructure. 
This unprecedented stimulus package, along with declining revenues due to the recession, 
has pushed the FY 2010 budget deficit to nearly $1.7 trillion, according to the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO).  The deficit was estimated to be 11.9 percent of GDP, the highest level 
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since World War II, according to CBO.  CBO reported that by 2019, the cost of servicing 
America’s debt will be $450 billion per year.70
Has this huge increase in debt influenced inflation expectations?  There are different 
ways of estimating expected inflation.  Typical ways are through surveys, models and yield 
curves.  There is the survey of households regarding expected inflation by the University of 
Michigan and there is the survey of Professional Forecasters.  The Federal Reserve uses a large 
macroeconomic simulation model, known as FRB/US to project inflation.  The Federal Reserve 
also uses measures derived from yields on nominal and inflation-indexed Treasury securities.  
These different means of measuring expected inflation have the added benefit of determining 
expected inflation of different sectors of society.  The Michigan survey of households reflects 
what consumers believe about future inflation. Modeling captures the viewpoint of the 
professional economist and comparing yields capture the market view in which investors back 
their views with real money, according to Ben Bernanke.
 
71
 
  The most recent median expected 
inflation rate of households during the year ahead from FRED is shown in Figure 47 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 Ron Scherer “Rebuilding the Economy”, The Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 2009. 
71 Ben S. Bernanke, “Inflation Expectations and Inflation Forecasting”  Speech at the Monetary Economics 
Workshop of the National Bureau of Economic Research Summer Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 10, 
2007. 
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Figure 47 Expected Inflation Rate 1 Year Ahead 
 
 
 
The following figure, with plotted data from the University of Michigan Survey of 
Consumers, shows the latest median expected annual inflation rate during the next five to ten 
years. 
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Figure 48 Expected Inflation Rate 5-10 Years Ahead 
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Both figures show how little expected inflation has increased, in spite of huge increases 
in actual and predicted deficits.  Inflation expectations remain relatively low despite the 2009 
fiscal year that ended September 30 with a budget deficit of 1.417 trillion dollars. This was 962 
billion dollars over FY 2008 budget deficit.  Inflation expectations averaged 2.5 percent from 
January 2009 to September 2009 and are approximately at their average level of the past 10 
years. 
Different snapshots in time of the nominal Treasury yield curve, from April 24, 2009 
through May 22, 2009, are shown in the figure below.  It shows an ascending or upward sloping 
yield curve.  The chart indicates that not only do interest rates increase with maturity, but over 
the time period in question, the yield curve has shifted upward.  An increase in forward rates is 
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typically due to expected future increases in the real interest rate, or expected future increases in 
inflation.72
 
 
Figure 49 Nominal Treasury Yield Curves 
 
 
 
To determine whether expected inflation or expected interest rates are causing the shift in 
the yield curve, one can look at the information provided by inflation-adjusted treasury securities 
(TIPS) shown below.  The figure shows that there is no increase in the implied forward real 
interest rates, suggesting that the shift in the curve is being caused by increasing inflation 
expectations.73
 
 
 
                                                 
72 Charles T. Carlstrom and Kyle Fee, “Inflation Expectations and Monetary Policy”,  The Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland, June 9, 2009, p.1. 
73 Ibid., p. 2. 
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Figure 50 TIPS-Estimated 5-10 Year Forward Interest Rate 
 
 
Following the recent huge increase in government debt, it has been shown that there has 
been an increase, although small, in inflation expectations.  Therefore, it would be expected that 
monetary policy may be effective in reducing ex ante real rates when accompanied by a large 
increase in expected federal budget deficits.
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CHAPTER 8 - Conclusion 
It has been shown that there are various meanings to the term “liquidity trap”.  If the term 
simply means the Federal Reserve, or any other central bank, is incapable of stimulating the 
economy out of a period of stagnation, then it has been shown that the United States is most 
likely in a liquidity trap.  However, if it means that the interest elasticity of demand for money, 
or interest elasticity of bank demand for excess reserves is extremely large (in absolute value), 
then it has not been shown empirically that the U.S. is in a liquidity trap.   Based on the data, the 
United States is most likely in a “liquidity trap” and it does matter.  The economy has not 
responded to a policy of near-zero interest rates by the Federal Reserve.  
No matter which meaning is used, it is implied that monetary policy is ineffective. 
Applying the modern view of a “liquidity trap”, monetary policy will work if there is scope for 
boosting expectations of future inflation.  This expectation of future inflation can be created 
through irresponsible monetary policy or fiscal policy. It was shown that the Federal Reserve is 
not conducting irresponsible monetary policy and is not trying to boost the public’s expectation 
of future inflation. Fiscal policy makers are also not trying to influence inflation expectations, 
but they are conducting enormous deficit spending in an attempt to stimulate the economy.  This 
has created only a slight increase in inflation expectations. Consequently, monetary policy 
appears to be having little effect as reported by the Federal Reserve. Credit is still tight, 
businesses are still cutting back on investment and the Federal Reserve expects economic 
activity to remain weak for a time.  As a result, the Federal Reserve stated that it intends to keep 
the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent for an extended period. 
 This brings into question the validity of the modern view of the “liquidity trap”, where 
monetary policy will continue to be effective because of inflation expectations.  This has been 
shown not to be the case.  What does show promise in making monetary policy effective is the 
vast array of new programs the Federal Reserve has created to pump liquidity into the economy. 
However, even these programs are ineffective unless they are expanded beyond depository 
institutions. The lesson being, that monetary policy must encompass all financial institutions. 
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Monetary policy conducted in this manner, in conjunction with a highly stimulative fiscal policy, 
will most likely eliminate any “liquidity trap” and make monetary policy effective once again. 
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